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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In Ricci v. DeStefano,1 the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
doctrine, first articulated by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2
that employers can be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) for neutral policies with a disparate impact
on minority workers.3 The Court has further held that employers
can escape liability by showing that a policy is job-related or con-
sistent with business necessity.4 
In the interim since Griggs, social scientists have generated a
substantial body of research designed to help employers comply with
the mandates of the doctrine.5 This evidence has undermined two
key elements of Griggs that have informed the application of the
disparate impact rule more generally. First, Griggs and its progeny
rest on the implicit assumption that fair and valid staffing practices
will result in workers from each race being hired or promoted in
rough proportion to their numbers in the background population or
in an otherwise appropriately defined pool of candidates.6 The so-
called four-fifths rule, under which an employer is presumptively
liable if the rate of hiring for minority workers is less than 80 per-
cent of the rate for the majority white population, reflects this
assumption.7 Second, the Court in Griggs noted the absence of evi-
dence that the screening criteria in that case—a high school diploma
and scores on a “professionally prepared aptitude test[ ]”—were
related to subsequent performance of the service jobs at issue, and
expressed doubt about the existence of such a relationship.8 
1. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672-73, 2676; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-32.
4. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.”).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
7. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010); infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
8. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28 (noting that neither of the aptitude tests required for hiring
and promotion in that case were “directed or intended to measure the ability to learn to
perform a particular job or category of jobs”); see also id. at 431-32 (noting the absence of a
demonstrable connection between the tests at issue and job performance and observing that
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Social science research casts doubt on both of these aspects of
Griggs. First, research in industrial and organizational psychology
(IOP) has repeatedly documented that, despite their imperfections,
tests and criteria such as those at issue in Griggs (which are heavily
“g”-loaded and thus dependent on cognitive ability) remain the best
predictors of performance for jobs at all levels of complexity.9
Second, work in psychometrics, educational demography, and labor
economics indicates that blacks, and to a lesser extent Hispanics,
currently lag behind whites both in cognitive ability test perfor-
mance and in the skills needed for success on the job.10 These gaps
are reflected in lower scores on the types of g-loaded job screens that
best predict job success.11 The combination of well-documented
racial differences in cognitive ability and the consistent link be-
tween ability and job performance generates a pattern that experts
term the “validity-diversity tradeoff ”: the most effective job selection
criteria consistently generate the smallest number of minority
hires.12 Indeed, the evidence indicates that most valid screening de-
vices will have a significant adverse impact on blacks and will also
violate the four-fifths rule under the law of disparate impact.13
 In sum, the IOP literature demonstrates that the empirical and
demographic premises behind the disparate impact rule do not
match reality and have turned out to be myths.14 As a consequence,
most legitimate job selection practices, including those that predict
productivity better than alternatives, will routinely trigger liability
under the current rule.15 Although the Supreme Court in Griggs and
subsequent cases has repeatedly stated that disparate impact
doctrine is consistent with a rigorously competitive meritocracy,16
workers at the company who had not graduated from high school or taken the test were
performing in a satisfactory manner). 
9. See infra Part II.B. The tests at issue in Griggs were the Wonderlic Personnel Test,
a standard type of intelligence test, and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 428.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See Kenneth R. Davis, Wheel of Fortune: A Critique of the “Manifest Imbalance”
Requirement for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 43 GA. L. REV. 993, 1037-
39 (2009) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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employers seeking to maintain such a meritocracy among a diverse
population will run a high risk of being sued for violations of the
rule.17 Such lawsuits will put employers to the onerous, uncertain,
and sometimes impossible task of justifying their job selection
practices. This may result in unwarranted liability or induce un-
desirable, self-protective strategies.18 Even in the absence of those
consequences, a proper application of the doctrine is unlikely to
change the racial composition of the workplace or to increase
demographic diversity. The best explanation for current workforce
imbalances is the existence of real average group differences in
knowledge, skills, and abilities. These human capital disparities,
and not the use of non-merit-related selection or the erection of
arbitrary barriers, best explain observed employment patterns. And
given the present magnitude of skill differences and the shortage of
qualified minority workers, the correct application of the disparate
impact rule will not increase workforce diversity and could well
make some jobs less diverse. 
In light of these observations, this Article proposes to modify the
doctrine of disparate impact to adopt a new standard of “disparate
impact realism.”19 The disparate impact rule should be revised by
making two changes in the standard that triggers potential liability.
First, the target four-fifths ratio of minority to majority hires should
be relaxed to reflect the empirically documented gap in actual pro-
ductivity between whites and minority workers. Second, the fixed
nature of the threshold ratio should be abandoned in favor of a
sliding scale relationship, documented in the IOP literature,20 that
pegs expected group staffing patterns to measured disparities in
group performance and the selectivity of particular positions. 
Although it does not altogether relieve employers of the burdens
imposed by the disparate impact rule, disparate impact realism
compares favorably with the current regime. By shrinking the num-
ber of employment practices that can potentially trigger liability,
realism lessens the pressure to hire a racially balanced workforce,
especially for highly selective jobs. Moreover, the uncertainties and
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.A.
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potential constitutional difficulties generated by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano21 make it desirable to
cut down on the number of situations that can generate disparate
impact claims.22 Finally, disparate impact realism functions as an
information-forcing device.23 By making it easier for employers to
satisfy the rule, and by aligning expectations with current labor
demographics, realism enhances employers’ incentives to devise
personnel practices that maintain productivity while achieving
maximally feasible diversity. 
Alternatively, this paper proposes abolishing the disparate impact
rule altogether.24 The principal argument for repeal is that, under
present social conditions, racial imbalances in employment are
exceedingly weak evidence of discrimination, either in the form of
race-based disparate treatment or through unlawful disparate
impact. The IOP data indicate that the distribution of skill and
human capital best explains observed patterns of adverse impact.
The gaps by race in developed abilities, not race-based exclusion or
arbitrary barriers to employment, are the principal factors behind
racial imbalances on the job.25 In light of these realities, the dis-
parate impact rule is fatally overbroad and ensnares far too much
conduct in its net. Under current social conditions, the vast majority
of commonly used selection procedures are valid and job-related and
thus do not actually violate the disparate impact rule.26 Yet most
valid personnel practices will routinely show enough adverse impact
to create a prima facie case of discrimination, thereby shifting the
burden of justification to employers.27 Given the legal uncertainties
and practical difficulties of defending disparate impact claims,
employers run a significant risk of being found liable regardless of
whether their defenses are valid and even though they are not
actually violating the rule.28 Because virtually no aspect of the
business necessity defense is settled law, employers face the
21. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
22. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See infra Part IV.B.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part IV.A.
28. See infra Part IV.A.
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prospect of protracted, expensive, uncertain, and resource-intensive
litigation to defend their practices.29 This encourages them to
engage in perverse, inefficient, and evasive tactics, including de
facto affirmative action.30 And even if employers avoid this response
or successfully resist a disparate impact challenge, they may be
required to expend significant time, attention, and resources on de-
fending their personnel selection methods. In sum, the overbreadth
of the disparate impact rule is both inefficient and fundamentally
unfair. If properly applied, the rule will prove costly but do little or
nothing to increase minority representation in the workforce. And
the racial preferences that may result are directly at odds with the
meritocratic goals of disparate impact principles.
The data currently reveal that most jobs are more diverse than
disparate impact doctrine actually requires.31 Indeed, blacks lag
behind whites in performance on the job in many categories.32 This
indicates that employers are not arbitrarily excluding minorities
from the workforce but are rather bending over backwards to
include them. In addition, disparate impact litigation does nothing
to correct the underlying skill deficits reflected in these on-the-job
gaps and drains resources from that task.33 The doctrine represents
a costly, misplaced effort that could better be directed at addressing
the root causes of workforce racial imbalance. 
     I. DISPARATE IMPACT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE   
DOCTRINE AND ITS UNCERTAINTIES
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,34 the Supreme Court ruled for the
first time that job requirements with a disparate impact on minor-
ities, despite being “neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent,” could be unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.35 The Court further held that an employer could escape
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. Id. at 430. The Supreme Court has also recognized that Title VII forbids disparate
treatment, defined as adverse action against an employee motivated by or taken because of
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liability if the job criteria at issue were shown to have “a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.”36 As the Court stated,
“[t]he touchstone is business necessity.”37 The Court ruled in Griggs
that the job requirements in that case—a high school diploma and
a minimum score on an IQ test—were impermissible because they
screened out too many black applicants and were not shown to be
“related to job performance” for the positions in question.38
 In Griggs and subsequent cases expanding on the disparate
impact doctrine, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
disparate impact rules do not mandate a particular racial balance
or ethnic makeup in the workplace.39 Rather, the objective is to
“achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.”40 The
doctrine’s stated goal of equal opportunity is consistent with a
competitive meritocracy in which businesses are assumed to have
a legitimate stake in selecting the best and most productive workers
and in developing and adopting personnel practices that best
accomplish this goal.41 On this view, employers are entitled to hold
all job seekers to uniform requirements, as long as they are work-
related.42 The goal of the disparate impact doctrine is therefore at
odds with race-conscious double standards or forms of affirmative
a protected characteristic, such as race or sex. See David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross
Beast of Burden of Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 905 (2010) (“Most
employment discrimination cases fall into two general categories: disparate treatment
(intentional discrimination) and disparate impact [which] occurs when a company has a policy
or practice that, while neutral on its face, adversely affects a protected class.” (footnote
omitted)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (finding
unlawful disparate treatment in a case of adverse treatment motivated by race). 
36. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
37. Id. at 431. 
38. See id. at 427-28, 431-32.
39. See, e.g., id. at 429-31; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992-93
(1988); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006). 
40. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. 
41. See Davis, supra note 16, at 1037 (“The Supreme Court has identified equality of
opportunity and meritocracy as goals of Title VII .... In [Griggs], the Court articulated these
objectives when creating the legal standard for disparate impact cases.” (footnote omitted));
see also Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 156-57 (2010) (“Title VII promotes selection that
is more merit-based and thus is not a mechanism to enact racial preferences.”).
42. See Davis, supra note 16, at 1037-38.
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action that selectively maintain less exacting criteria for some social
or racial groups.43 
In the wake of Griggs, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the courts have been charged with crafting
rules consistent with the doctrine’s stated goals and creating
guidelines for their application.44 The Supreme Court has addressed
adverse impact in only a few cases, and its decisions are vague or
silent on key questions that routinely arise in litigation.45 In light
of this lack of guidance, the lower courts have grappled with defin-
ing staffing patterns that trigger application of the rule and with
identifying the appropriate population or pool against whom ad-
verse impact is measured.46 Courts have also been asked to clarify
the standards for job-relatedness and to determine the scope of the
business necessity defense that employers can invoke to escape
liability once a prima facie is demonstrated.47 All of these issues
have generated considerable uncertainty and none has received a
definitive resolution. 
On the question of the hiring patterns that trigger liability, the
EEOC, through the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, has adopted what is known as the four-fifths, or 80-
43. That the goals of disparate impact enforcement are inconsistent with race-based
affirmative action has been widely and consistently recognized. See, e.g., Susan O. Carle, A
Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 258-59
(2011) (“Popular perception sometimes conflates disparate impact analysis with affirmative
action, but the two antidiscrimination concepts are actually quite different.” (footnote
omitted)); id. at 296 (noting that disparate impact is often confused with “bugbears such as
quotas, strong race-conscious mandates, and harsh forms of affirmative action”); Harris &
West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 156-57. See generally George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano:
Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 83-84. Attempts to use
disparate impact doctrine to engage in conscious racial balancing have been turned back by
Congress. So-called “race-norming,” or adjusting scores or selection methods based on race,
was outlawed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 106, 107(a) (“It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection
or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of,
use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). For more discussion of race-norming
and the distinction between the disparate impact theory and affirmative action, see infra Part
IV.A.
44. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 713.
45. See Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 35, at 905 (“[T]he Supreme Court has addressed
adverse impact cases on a few occasions.”).
46. See infra Part IV.A.
47. See infra Part IV.A.
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percent rule, as a touchstone for determining adverse impact.48
Hiring or promoting minorities at less than 80 percent of the rate
for the majority group gives rise to a potential violation and suffices
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination.49
Partly in response to critiques of the four-fifths rule as insufficiently
nuanced and statistically naive,50 the courts have not relied
exclusively on this metric, with some scrutinizing workplace
diversity using commonplace tests of statistical significance.51
Although the courts and the EEOC permit recourse to alternative
48. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(2010) (“[A] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5)
(or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded
... as evidence of adverse impact.”). Courts are not bound by the Guidelines, but the Supreme
Court has said that they should receive “great deference.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 433-34 (1971). The Supreme Court embraced the four-fifths rule in Connecticut v. Teal,
457 U.S. 440, 443 n.4 (1982), and subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988).
Lower courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine in disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Bradley
v. City of Lynn, 433 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159 (D. Mass. 2006); Thompson v. Miss. State Personnel
Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198, 206 (N.D. Miss. 1987). For recent reviews of the standard for a prima
facie case, see Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 135-36; Rutherglen, supra note 43,
at 105-06. 
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
50. See, e.g., Nancy T. Tippins, Adverse Impact in Employee Selection Procedures from the
Perspective of an Organizational Consultant, in ADVERSE IMPACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION 201, 203 (James L. Outtz ed., 2010)
[hereinafter ADVERSE IMPACT]; Sheldon Zedeck, Adverse Impact: History and Evolution, in
ADVERSE IMPACT, supra, at 3, 14-15 (suggesting that, under some circumstances, a four-fifths
rule violation could easily occur by chance).
51. See, e.g., Clady v. Cnty. of L.A., 770 F.2d 1421, 1428-29 (9th Cir. 1985).
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methods,52 the four-fifths rule remains an important benchmark for
establishing a presumptive disparate impact violation. 
In applying the four-fifths rule, the courts have confronted the
problem of defining the applicable baseline population against
which to assess unlawful impacts. Questions arise as to whether the
four-fifths target should be gauged against a broader cohort, such as
the adult work-eligible population, or defined more narrowly to
include, for example, actual job applicants or work-eligible persons
possessing threshold qualifications.53 All of these approaches are
problematic, and some are open to challenge on the very principles
underlying the disparate impact rule. Using applicants is suspect
because employers who discriminate may discourage minorities
from applying, thus skewing the baseline pool.54 Threshold require-
ments of any kind can end up screening out minority applicants.
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (stating that smaller differences in selection rate than
dictated by the four-fifths rule may constitute adverse impact differences where these are
“significant in both statistical and practical terms”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent
Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 777 (2009) (“Plaintiffs generally
prove [disparate impact] causation by comparing selection rates of majority and minority
applicants for a position and then showing that the disparity is statistically significant or that
it violates the four-fifths rule.”); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 n.14 (1977) (noting a “general rule” in employment discrimination cases with sufficiently
large samples that “if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is
greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that [employees] were
hired without regard to race would be suspect” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
generally Philip Bobko & Philip L. Roth, An Analysis of Two Methods for Assessing and
Indexing Adverse Impact: A Disconnect Between the Academic Literature and Some Practice,
in ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 29-34 (noting the use of the four-fifths rule as well as
various tests of statistical significance in disparate impact cases and observing that the EEOC
endorses the four-fifths rule but also permits the use of recognized tests of statistical
significance in conjunction with or in place of that criterion in appropriate cases).
53. See Peresie, supra note 52, at 778 (“Plaintiffs must establish disparate impact with
respect to the pool of qualified persons in the relevant labor market for the given position.
Most often, plaintiffs present statistics from the actual applicant pool for the position.
Plaintiffs might also choose to use national population statistics; state data, as in Griggs; or
data from a smaller geographic area.” (footnotes omitted)). 
54. See, e.g., Scott Baker, Comment, Defining “Otherwise Qualified Applicants”: Applying
an Antitrust Relevant-Market Analysis to Disparate Impact Cases, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 732
(2000) (“The obvious flaw [in using only actual applicants to define the job applicant pool] is
that it ignores the effect that a hiring requirement that is known to have a disparate impact
would have on a potentially qualified applicant’s decision whether or not to apply for the job
in the first place. It is unlikely that a potentially qualified applicant would take the time to
apply for a job if she knew that a particular hiring requirement would prevent her from
getting the job.”).
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Thus using such requirements to define potential candidates is
itself vulnerable to challenge under the disparate impact rule.55
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has set no clear standard for
identifying the population against which workplace disparate
impact should be assessed and the lower courts vary in their
approach.56 This aspect of disparate impact doctrine is in serious
disarray.
Another crucial issue in disparate impact doctrine is the standard
for establishing the defense of job-relatedness consistent with busi-
ness necessity. Showing job-relatedness involves demonstrating a
relationship between a screening device and ability to do the job—a
process known as validation.57 Drawing on standards developed by
the courts as well as work in the IOP field, the EEOC guidelines
recognize three principal methods by which employers can justify
their selection procedures: content, construct, and criterion valida-
tion.58 Both construct and criterion validation require demonstrating
55. It can be argued that the point of disparate impact scrutiny is to question the job-
relatedness of every requirement or selection factor that might produce an adverse impact.
The assumption implicit in this view is familiar from Griggs: that all persons, regardless of
group identity, are presumed equally qualified to do every job, and that every qualification,
requirement, and job hurdle that generates a departure from racial balance must be justified
as job-related. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971). The actual practice
does not always adhere to this analysis. See Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the
Problem of “Included Variable Bias” 54 (Oct. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/currently/seminars/lawandeconomics/papers/AyresIncludedVari
ableBias.pdf. On the problem of identifying the baseline population for purposes of disparate
impact analysis, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989) (raising
the question of how to define the eligible pool for disparate impact scrutiny). See generally
Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983).
56. See Baker, supra note 54, at 732 (“Because the Supreme Court has not laid out specific
guidelines for defining the scope of the qualified applicant pool, district courts have developed
various methods for making this determination.”); id. at 728-31 (discussing cases); Joseph L.
Gastwirth, Employment Discrimination: A Statistician’s Look at Analysis of Disparate Impact
Claims, 11 LAW & INEQ. 151, 157-58, 167 (1992) (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the
identification of the majority and minority labor market pool available for particular jobs); see
also, e.g., NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 998 F. Supp. 176, 186-88 (D. Conn. 1998) (deeming
applicant pool to consist of qualified teachers from defined geographical area); Peresie, supra
note 52, at 778.
57. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 144-45.
58. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (2010).
For a description of current EEOC guidelines, see Brief of Industrial-Organizational
Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5-7, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009) (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328) [hereinafter IOP Brief]. The inference of validity
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a formal and statistically valid relationship between job selection
methods and either specified job-related skills (construct validation)
or workers’ actual performance on the job (criterion validation).59 As
the most rigorous and demanding process, criterion validation is
considered the gold standard and is the focus of considerable study
by IOP experts.60 In contrast, content or “facial” validation is re-
garded as less exacting.61 Content validation does not generally
require a formal demonstration that a job criterion actually predicts
superior job performance or productivity.62 Rather, it depends on
showing a manifest relationship or plausible match between the
abilities assessed and the tasks that must actually be performed on
the job.63 
The intricacies of the validation rules compound the burden of
defending personnel practices. The details of the Guidelines are
complex and ambiguous, and courts’ standards are erratic. Although
the Guidelines recommend formal statistical validation, they also
accept the use of content validation—the demonstration that selec-
tion criteria are closely geared to job tasks—without clarifying
which methods are appropriate in which cases.64 In the same vein,
the Supreme Court made clear in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
rests on: 
evidence ... that a test identifies those who are qualified to do the job. Content
validity supports [an inference of validity] by showing that the test’s content
matches the essential content of the job, while criterion validity supports the
inference by showing that test results successfully predict job performance.
Construct validity is more abstract and is shown by evidence that the test
measures the degree to which candidates have characteristics, or traits, that
have been determined to lead to successful job performance.
Id. at 7 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 939-42 (1993); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note
41, at 144-47 (reviewing validation standards); Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 106-07
(reviewing validation standards).
59. See supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., supra note 58.
62. See IOP Brief, supra note 58, at 7 n.2.
63. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in “General Ability” Job Testing, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1171 & n.35 (1991) (discussing forms of validation); Philip L. Roth, Philip
Bobko & Lynn A. McFarland, A Meta-Analysis of Work Sample Test Validity: Updating and
Integrating Some Classic Literature, 58 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1009, 1016 (2005) (same). 
64. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (2010).
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Trust65 that rigorous statistical validation of selection methods is
not required in every instance, but did not elaborate further.66 This
lack of guidance means that the courts vary widely in the standards
they apply and retain broad discretion in deciding what kind of
evidence satisfies the business necessity defense.67 Some courts
show a deferential attitude towards defendants’ practices, whereas
others express skepticism, reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s
doubts in Griggs about the relationship between competency tests
and job performance, especially for jobs requiring lower levels of
skill.68 Some courts accept relaxed forms of content validation,
resting on appeals to common sense,69 or to the finding of a
“manifest relationship” between pre-employment criteria and
65. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
66. Id. at 998 (noting that formal validation studies are infeasible in some cases, and
stating that “[e]mployers are not required, even when defending standardized or objective
tests, to introduce formal ‘validation studies’ showing that particular criteria predict actual
on-the-job performance”); see also Sujata S. Menjoge, Comment, Testing the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law: How Employers’ Use of Pre-Employment Psychological and Personality
Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA, 82 N.C. L. REV. 326, 360 (2003) (“[D]espite the
recommendation by the EEOC that defendants use validation studies to determine whether
a test is job-related, defendants do not need to provide any formal validation study that
psychological or personality criteria predict actual on-the-job performance.” (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5 (2010))).
67. See infra notes 69-70.
68. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. Compare Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (demanding
demonstration of empirical validity in black college graduates’ challenge to the Federal
Service Entrance Examination (FSEE) by “identifying criteria that indicate successful job
performance and then showing a correlation between test scores and those criteria”), with
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (interpreting Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to require an employer to “show that its selection criteria bear ‘a manifest
relationship to the employment in question’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971))). 
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successful job performance,70 whereas others demand rigorous
statistical data.71 
Another area of uncertainty is the strength of the relationship
that must be demonstrated in the validation process. It is unclear,
for example, how predictive a hiring or promotion criterion must be
to survive scrutiny. The law does not specify a number, and the
courts have provided no guidance on the required magnitude of
the link—as expressed, for example, in a correlation coefficient—
between a job screen and subsequent workplace performance.
Likewise, neither the Supreme Court nor the EEOC has ever
squarely addressed the question of whether an employer can use the
most predictive filter or standard available, regardless of whether
that choice increases disparate impact compared to a less predictive
method. Relatedly, the law is unclear on whether employers are free
to create as competitive a process for staffing the workplace as the
70. See Ass’n of Mex.-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2000) (using
manifest relationship test to evaluate employer’s business necessity defense in disparate
impact claim); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 1999)
(using manifest relationship test); NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir.
1995) (mandating manifest relationship between employment and job screen); Zamlen v. City
of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1990) (following standard that uses manifest
relationship test); Davis v. City of Dall., 777 F.2d 205, 211 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying manifest
relationship standard); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir. 1971)
(adopting manifest relationship standard). Some courts have adopted the so-called “Spurlock
doctrine,” also known as the “demonstrably necessary” test, which has been interpreted as
requiring a somewhat closer relationship between criterion and job, although stopping short
of demanding actual statistical validation. See, e.g., Bew v. City of Chi., 252 F.3d 891, 894 (7th
Cir. 2001) (outlining requirement for business necessity defense, using demonstrably
necessary standard); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (employing
demonstrably necessary standard for disparate impact cases); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,
2 F.3d 1112, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 1993) (employing demonstrably necessary standard); Banks
v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 35-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (adopting demonstrably necessary
standard); Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors, 929 F. Supp. 583, 594 (D.R.I. 1996) (using
similar standard). Legal scholars have criticized content validation as too easy to satisfy,
while also recognizing that disparate impact doctrine presents the courts with the unpalatable
choice of “either requiring businesses ... to conduct expensive validation studies to establish
business necessity or watering down the defendant’s burden of proof to the point of
meaninglessness.” Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 994 (2005) (citing Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1237 (1995)); see also id. (recognizing that formal
validation is often impracticable but also that formal validation is not required “across the
spectrum of disparate impact cases”).
71. Douglas, 512 F.2d at 984-85.
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market will bear, or whether they must give equal consideration to
candidates who have demonstrated a minimum level of com-
petence.72 Finally, some courts have compounded the uncertainty by
adopting a more exacting approach based on language in some
Supreme Court opinions, as ambiguously codified in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, that suggests that an employer can establish a business
necessity defense only if no equally valid or job-related selection
method with less adverse impact is available.73 Because satisfying
this requirement amounts to proving a negative, courts that impose
this standard make the job-relatedness defense significantly harder
to establish. 
The vagueness of the law on these key questions gives the courts
considerable leeway to decide how strictly to apply the job-related-
ness or business necessity defense.74 It also has generated consider-
72. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Scharff, Antidiscrimination in Employment: The
Simple, the Complex, and the Paradoxical 6 (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper
No. 10-10, 2010). These authors suggest that disparate impact can be construed to “reduc[e
hiring] criteria to the minimum level of competence rather than the most credentialed
employees,” thereby “den[ying] employers the option of taking advantage of a surplus of
overqualified workers and demanding higher-level credentials in their workforce.” Id.
However, there is no support in the statute or the case law for this “minimalist” view of
disparate impact’s requirements. In fact, Title VII permits employers “to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test” that is “not designed, intended, or used
to discriminate” and does not otherwise limit the use of such criteria by, for example,
forbidding the top-down hiring of the best performers. Carle, supra note 43, at 285 n.208
(describing the Title VII language permitting the use of ability tests). 
73. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that an
employer violates the disparate impact rule if the plaintiff demonstrates that there is another
job-related device available with less adverse impact and the defendant “refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice”). Despite language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
suggesting that the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the alternative selection
method, the courts have been divided on who must make this showing. Compare Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 442 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 2006) (placing the
burden on plaintiff), with Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., 7 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the employer must show a “compelling need ... to maintain that practice ... and that there
is no alternative to the challenged practice” (citation omitted)). See generally Harris & West-
Faulcon, supra note 41, at 160-61 (discussing the “less discriminatory alternative”
requirement).
74. See Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 106-07 (noting ambiguities surrounding the business
necessity defense and stating that “[t]he particular language adopted by Congress [in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991] just perpetuates the ambiguity that can be found throughout the opinion
in Griggs and, it is fair to say, in every opinion of the Supreme Court” addressing the business
necessity defense, which leaves unresolved whether “the employer’s burden of justifying a
practice with adverse impact is a light burden ... or a heavy burden”).
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able confusion among potential parties and the judiciary, which is
reflected in the cases challenging job testing in general and civil
service tests for public servants in particular.75 In addition, the
technical nature of the validation process requires parties to present
testimony from specialists in the IOP field, which often issues in an
expensive and protracted “battle of the experts.”76 All of these
factors ensure that defending a business practice with adverse im-
pact will, by definition, be a costly, burdensome, and risky process.
In the midst of these uncertainties, two key features of disparate
impact doctrine, originating in Griggs, have informed the courts’
subsequent application of the rule. First, Griggs proceeds from the
assumption, albeit implicit, that fair and valid personnel practices
will result in workers from each race being hired or promoted in
rough proportion to their numbers in the population or the appropri-
ately defined pool of job candidates.77 That assumption finds ex-
pression in the subsequent development and wide acceptance of the
four-fifths rule for establishing a prima facie case of unlawful
disparate impact. That rule effectively embodies the expectation
75. As a general matter, courts tend to be more forgiving of requirements geared closely
to job tasks and more suspicious of tests of general ability, such as the intelligence exams at
issue in Griggs, but approaches vary. For example, in Ricci, the Supreme Court accepted a
form of content validation for the firefighter supervisors’ test at issue. See Rutherglen, supra
note 43, at 107 (“On the spectrum between heavier and lighter burdens of justification, the
[Ricci] Court came down decidedly in favor of a lighter burden.”). The lower courts in that case
relied largely on expert testimony and evidence concerning the test development process. This
evidence indicated that the exam was carefully geared to assessing the knowledge and skills
needed to perform a firefighter supervisor’s job. Id. at 87. The courts did not demand a
statistical demonstration of the tests’ ability to predict superior performance. Id. at 89-91. In
contrast, lower courts in other cases have faulted the paucity of statistically valid data
concerning the predictive validity of firefighter tests. See, e.g., United States v. City of New
York, 637 F. Supp. 77, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Heather MacDonald, Fighting Fire with
Quotas, CITY J., Oct. 24, 2010, http://www.city-journal.org/2010/eon1024hm.html (noting the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ disparate impact challenge to
New York City’s firefighters’ exams after finding the City’s evidence of job-relatedness
inadequate); see also Lewis v. City of Chi., No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22,
2005) (rejecting firefighters’ exam on disparate impact grounds), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2196,
2200-01 (2010). For cases invalidating firefighter screening requirements and written civil
service tests, see Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 254 nn.233-34 (2010) (collecting
cases).
76. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664, 2670 (2009) (discussing voluminous
testimony for both sides concerning the content validity of the firefighters’ test in that case).
77. See Zedeck, supra note 50, at 11-12.
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that the workforce will reflect the racial composition of the back-
ground working-age population.78 Second, in applying the business
necessity defense, the Court in Griggs noted the absence of evidence
that the screening criteria in that case (a high school diploma and
scores on an intelligence test) were related to job performance.79 And
the Court’s opinion expresses skepticism about whether those
requirements would bear any relationship to performance in the
relatively unskilled jobs at issue.80 Although the case law is mixed,
subsequent decisions, especially those involving less skilled posi-
tions or government jobs, have been skeptical of screening tests that
measure or draw heavily on general cognitive ability.
As the discussion below shows, however, subsequent work in
social science reveals that the assumptions underlying Griggs lack
support. First, IOP research, as well as work in labor economics and
educational demography, indicates that blacks, and to a lesser
extent Hispanics, currently lag behind whites in the skill sets that
predict proficiency in a broad range of jobs.81 Direct measures of job
performance ratings also reveal that, on average, these groups
perform less well than whites at work.82 Second, the data indicate
that, despite their imperfections, tests and criteria such as those at
issue in Griggs, which are heavily g-loaded—that is, dependent on
cognitive ability—remain the best predictors of performance for jobs
at all levels of complexity.83 The g-dependency of job selection
methods both contributes to their usefulness and accounts for their
adverse impact. As the subsequent discussion explains, these real-
ities are inconsistent with the key understandings articulated in
Griggs and carried forward in subsequent cases. The tension
between the evidence and the founding myths of Griggs creates
practical problems for disparate impact litigation and argues for a
substantial revision in the rules for disparate impact cases. 
78. Bobko & Roth, supra note 52, at 30-32.
79. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
80. Id. at 431-33.
81. See infra Part II.
82. See infra Part II.
83. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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       II. EVIDENCE ON DISPARATE IMPACT: INDUSTRIAL AND        
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (IOP) RESEARCH
In confronting the challenges of selecting and managing a work-
force without running afoul of the disparate impact rule, employers
have enlisted the assistance of experts trained in IOP.84 In the years
since Griggs, an explosion of scholarly research has sought to
address the problems employers face in seeking to comply with the
mandates of disparate impact, including meeting the four-fifths
target and establishing a job-relatedness or business necessity
defense in the event of legal challenge.85 Accordingly, research in
this field has become increasingly focused on achieving two simul-
taneous goals: first, developing effective personnel practices that
minimize adverse impact on racial minorities; and second, identify-
ing valid job selection devices and establishing their link to job
productivity for the purpose of satisfying the courts’ definition of job-
relatedness. 
Basic premises of the IOP research literature are that the
workplace should ideally function as a competitive meritocracy, and
that this situation is consistent with disparate impact’s require-
ments.86 Thus, researchers proceed from the understanding that
competitive staffing practices that help employers maximize em-
ployee productivity are legitimate and lawful. More specifically, job
selection metrics that are both valid and unbiased—in being equally
predictive of productivity for persons from all groups—are assumed
to best advance the meritocratic idea of equal opportunity embodied
in the law of disparate impact.87 In addition, experts recognize that
employers have an interest in creating the most productive work-
force possible by finding the best workers regardless of race or back-
ground. Finally, it is understood that staffing decisions are routinely
made under conditions of scarcity. Because there are usually more
job applicants than there are positions available, employers must be
84. See, e.g., Tippins, supra note 50, at 202-03.
85. See, e.g., Bobko & Roth, supra note 52, at 29-30; Zedeck, supra note 50, at 17.
86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
87. Keith Hattrup & Brandon G. Roberts, What Are the Criteria for Adverse Impact?, in
ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 161, 161-63.
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selective and are in a position to pick and choose among available
workers.88
In helping businesses meet disparate impact requirements in
light of these conventions, IOP experts and psychometricians have
generated a large body of empirical research and statistical data
concerning the validity and adverse impact of various personnel
screening devices. In analyzing the implications of this research,
IOP experts have generally taken the four-fifths rule as an impor-
tant benchmark for triggering liability under disparate impact,
although they also make use of conventional tests of statistical sig-
nificance.89 Much effort is devoted to correlating performance on job
screens with supervisor assessments of workers in various positions,
as reflected by different types of ratings and evaluations commonly
performed in the workplace. Data has also accumulated on group
differences in performance on a range of widely used screens and in
various occupations.90 
In fact, psychometricians and demographers have long been
interested in identifying methods for selecting good workers, and
much research on predicting job performance predates the decision
in Griggs. In assessing selection devices, IOP experts try to dem-
onstrate measurable, reproducible, and statistically significant cor-
relations with actual employment outcomes—that is, they focus on
formal validation of job screening criteria.91 Establishing the
predictive validity of selection devices thus rests on the ability to
measure job performance accurately. Accordingly, IOP experts are
preoccupied with investigating and developing sound methods for
evaluating workers, with the ultimate aims of devising job screening
88. Building Better Organizations: Industrial-Organizational Psychology in the Workplace,
SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL., http://www.siop.org/visibilitybrochure/memberbrochure.
aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); see also Jerard F. Kehoe, Cut Scores and Adverse Impact, in
ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 289, 289-90.
89. See Bobko & Roth, supra note 52, at 41.
90. See Maximizing Human Potential Within Organizations: Learning the Science Behind
Talent Management, SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL., http://www.siop.org/visibility
brochure/visibility.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
91. See Guidelines for Education and Training at the Masters Level in Industrial-
Organizational Psychology, SOC’Y FOR INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL., http://www.siop.org/
guidelines.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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instruments that best predict performance and quantifying the
predictive validity of those methods.92
A. Job Screening Methods and Predictions of Job Performance
In managing the workplace, employers must routinely decide
whom to hire and whom to promote into various positions. Depend-
ing on the nature and selectivity of the jobs at issue, employers rely
on a range of procedures for recruiting applicants and choosing
workers.93 In developing a pool of eligible candidates, some manag-
ers use informal methods like word-of-mouth referrals and personal
recommendations, whereas others make use of more formalized
protocols, including extensive advertising and posting of jobs. When
it comes to evaluating candidates for hiring or promotion, employers
rely heavily on years of education, type of educational experience,
and specialized training (collectively known in the field as
“biodata”), and then use devices such as job interviews, personality
or skill tests, recommendation letters, and other specialized screens
to choose among applicants.94 Entry to higher level jobs is often
restricted to persons who have completed high school, college, or
graduate degrees. Selection for some positions depends on scores on
written exams, ranging from standardized tests of intelligence, apti-
tude, or cognitive ability, to specialized assessments of job knowl-
edge, competence, or skill (including civil service and professional
qualifying exams), to personality or “integrity” tests.95 Recently,
92. Id.
93. For a review of job selection methods, see Walter C. Borman, Mary Ann Hanson &
Jerry W. Hedge, Personnel Selection, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 299, 299-301 (1997); John E.
Hunter & Ronda F. Hunter, Validity and Utility of Alternative Predictors of Job Performance,
96 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 72-73, 96 (1984); Frank L. Schmidt & John E. Hunter, The Validity
and Utility of Selection Methods in Personnel Psychology: Practical and Theoretical
Implications of 85 Years of Research Findings, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 262, 262-63 (1998); see
also Bobko & Roth, supra note 52, at 29-31.
94. See sources cited supra note 93.
95. On general ability, or intelligence, tests in personnel selection, see Kelman, supra note
63, at 1158-59; James L. Outtz, The Role of Cognitive Ability Tests in Employment Selection,
15 HUM. PERFORMANCE 161, 169-70 (2002). On personality measures, see Murray R. Barrick
& Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-
Analysis, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1991); Murray R. Barrick, Michael K. Mount &
Timothy A. Judge, Personality and Performance at the Beginning of the New Millennium:
What Do We Know and Where Do We Go Next?, 9 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 9 (2001).
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prompted partly by concerns about the adverse impact of conven-
tional paper-and-pencil tests that draw on reading and verbal
ability, experts have developed various alternative instruments,
administered at so-called “assessment centers,” that are intended
more precisely to mirror actual job requirements. These alternatives
make use of task or job simulations, real-time problem-solving
exercises, work sample or “in-box” evaluations, and exams adminis-
tered orally or using audio-visual techniques.96 
By collecting data on screening methods in a variety of contexts,
industrial psychologists have identified the factors most predictive
of job performance over a wide range of occupations. Although
estimates of the magnitude and relative power of correlations are
somewhat sensitive to methodology and job-specific parameters, a
consensus has emerged that measures of general cognitive ability
—also designated as g or IQ—are generally the best predictors of
work performance for all types of positions, with correlations in the
range of approximately .5 or more with measured outcomes.97 This
On job screening interviews, see Jose M. Cortina, Nancy B. Goldstein, Stephanie C. Payne,
H. Kristl Davison & Stephen W. Gilliland, The Incremental Validity of Interview Scores over
and Above Cognitive Ability and Conscientiousness Scores, 53 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 325, 325-
26 (2000); Allen I. Huffcut & Winfred Arthur, Jr., Hunter and Hunter (1984) Revisited:
Interview Validity for Entry-Level Jobs, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 184, 189 (1994). On job
knowledge and job skills tests, see IOP Brief, supra note 58, at 3-5.
96. On methods of job screening, including the use of so-called “assessment center”
protocols to gauge an applicant’s ability to deal with situations commonly encountered on the
job, see Paul R. Sackett & Filip Lievens, Personnel Selection, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 419, 425-
50 (2008). On job performance simulations and problem-solving exercises, see Barbara B.
Gaugler, Douglas B. Rosenthal, George C. Thornton III & Cynthia Bentson, Meta-Analysis
of Assessment Center Validity, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 493, 493-94, 505 (1987). On work
samples, see Roth, Bobko & McFarland, supra note 63, at 1009-10. For a review of
alternatives to paper-and-pencil tests of ability and job knowledge, see Neal Schmitt,
Catherine Clause & Elaine Pulakos, Subgroup Differences Associated with Different Measures
of Some Common Job-Relevant Constructs, 11 INT’L REV. INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL. 115, 116-17
(1996).
97. See, e.g., Nathan R. Kuncel & Sarah A. Hezlett, Fact and Fiction in Cognitive Ability
Testing for Admission and Hiring Decisions, 19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 339, 339
(2010) (“Standardized tests of cognitive abilities ... are some of the strongest and most
consistent predictors of performance in educational and work settings.”); see also Harold W.
Goldstein, Charles A. Scherbaum & Kenneth P. Yusko, Revisiting g: Intelligence, Adverse
Impact, and Personnel Selection, in ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 95, 100 (“An additional
central point of the psychometric perspective is that g is the most important quality that
determines success of all types, including at work.”); id. at 116 (noting reports of correlations
of .51-.56 of general ability test scores with job performance, with higher correlations for
demanding jobs, and stating the view that “intelligence tests are the single best predictor of
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observation, which comes out of decades of research and thousands
of studies, is now widely accepted among IOP experts and, indeed,
is a basic, shared premise of the field. The predictive value of
cognitive performance, although perhaps not intuitively obvious and
in tension with some popular ideas,98 is grounded in the character
and variety of tasks workers are asked to perform within our
modern, complex economy. General intelligence has been observed
to correlate with a host of functions, “such as learning, memory,
grasping concepts, reasoning, problem solving, and more,” that vir-
tually all jobs, whether simple or complex, draw upon or require.99
Thus, to the extent that Griggs v. Duke Power Co. suggests that
cognitive ability tests are a poor predictor of performance in
relatively unskilled jobs, the evidence belies the Court’s skepticism.
A similar observation holds for a high school diploma requirement,
job performance and thus should be afforded special status in the area of personnel
selection”); Hunter & Hunter, supra note 93, at 72 (citing “cumulative research” showing that
“for entry-level jobs there is no predictor with validity equal to that of [cognitive] ability,
which has a mean validity of .53”); John E. Hunter & Frank L. Schmidt, Intelligence and Job
Performance: Economic and Social Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 447, 447 (1996)
(expounding on the unmatched predictive power of IQ); Kuncel & Hezlett, supra, at 341
(noting the substantial correlation between cognitive ability and performance for jobs of high,
medium, and low complexity); Patrick F. McKay, Perspectives on Adverse Impact in Work
Performance: What We Know and What We Could Learn More About, in ADVERSE IMPACT,
supra note 50, at 249, 253 (“Cognitive ability is the strongest single predictor of job
performance.”); Outtz, supra note 95, at 161 (noting correlation of about .5 between cognitive
ability and job productivity); James L. Outtz & Daniel A. Newman, A Theory of Adverse
Impact, in ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 53, 68 (“A great deal of empirical evidence has
been amassed to support the correlation between cognitive test scores and job performance
measures.”); Malcolm James Ree & James A. Earles, Intelligence Is the Best Predictor of Job
Performance, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 86, 87-88 (1992) (discussing data showing
that IQ is the best predictor of performance, based on datasets on many thousands of military
recruits); Schmidt & Hunter, supra note 93, at 264 (concluding, based on “thousands of
studies conducted over the last nine decades,” that general mental ability “has been shown
to be the best available predictor of job-related learning ... job knowledge ... [and] performance
in job training programs,” and that “the theoretical foundation for [general mental ability] is
stronger than for any other personnel measure”). See generally Sackett & Lievens, supra note
96, at 440-41 (reviewing developments in personnel selection methods as confirming the
superior predictive power of IQ); Robert L. Thorndike, The Central Role of General Ability in
Prediction, 20 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 241, 253 (1985) (“In the context of practical
prediction ‘g’ appears to be alive and well.”); infra note 133 and accompanying text (comparing
intelligence tests with other job performance predictors). 
98. See, e.g., infra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the construct fallacy); see
also discussion of misconceptions about alternative predictors, including efforts to find filters
that match or surpass cognitive performance, infra Part II.B.
99. Goldstein, Scherbaum & Yusko, supra note 97, at 97.
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because the number of years of education achieved is closely
correlated with intelligence.100 In fact, people with higher IQs (and
also more education) will, on average, perform better in any job than
people with lower measured intelligence or less schooling.
A related observation is that job screens that depend heavily on
intellectual ability tend to predict subsequent job performance
better than metrics that place less emphasis on IQ or give greater
weight to other characteristics. Devices such as integrity tests or
personality measures, which are relatively uncorrelated with g, are
significantly less predictive of outcomes than cognitive ability tests.
For example, measures of conscientiousness—the personality trait
with the strongest link to job success—show a correlation with job
performance in the range of .18 to .37, in contrast to the correlation
of .5 or more for IQ.101 In fact, most job selection devices that have
proven somewhat useful tap into general cognitive ability. As
already noted, the acquisition of educational credentials, including
degrees completed and scores on academic tests, is dependent on
general intelligence. Interviews, tests of job knowledge or compe-
tence, and situational problem-solving exercises also draw on cog-
nitive skills. This is not surprising. Intelligence is highly correlated
with the ability to learn, and job knowledge is a function of learning
through studying or through job experience. Likewise, scores on
100. See, e.g., David Rowe, Wendy Vesterdal & Joseph Rodgers, Herrnstein’s Syllogism:
Genetic and Shared Environmental Influences on IQ, Education, and Income, 26
INTELLIGENCE 405, 405 (1998) (noting a correlation of .63 between years of education and IQ
in a large sample of subjects from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth).
101. See Barrick & Mount, supra note 95, at 1 (discussing conscientiousness as a
performance predictor); Barrick, Mount & Judge, supra note 95, at 9-11 (same); Cortina,
Goldstein, Payne, Davison & Gilliland, supra note 95, at 340-43 (same); Timothy A. Judge,
Chad A. Higgins, Carl J. Thoresen & Murray R. Barrick, The Big Five Personality Traits,
General Mental Ability, and Career Success Across the Life Span, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL.
621, 640 (1999) (acknowledging that conscientiousness is a less powerful predictor of job
performance than cognitive measures of mental ability); Deniz S. Ones, Chockalingam
Viswesvaran & Frank L. Schmidt, Comprehensive Meta-Analysis of Integrity Test Validities:
Findings and Implications for Personnel Selection and Theories of Job Performance, 78 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 679, 696-97 (1993) (reporting on the predictive validity of integrity tests);
Daniel J. Ozer & Veronica Benet-Martinez, Personality and the Prediction of Consequential
Outcomes, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 401, 411-12 (2006) (finding conscientiousness to be
moderately predictive of work performance); Paul R. Sackett & James E. Wanek, New
Developments in the Use of Measures of Honesty, Integrity, Conscientiousness, Dependability,
Trustworthiness, and Reliability for Personnel Selection, 49 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 787, 787-90
(1996) (discussing relationship between conscientiousness and work performance).
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interviews are sensitive to verbal skill and analytic acumen, which
have an established correlation with general mental ability.
Nonetheless, none of these methods has proven as reliable as pure
measures of general intelligence, and none predicts job success as
well as IQ.102 
B. Job Screening Methods and Adverse Impact:                         
The Validity-Diversity Tradeoff
In addition to identifying selection methods that predict success
on the job, IOP experts have also been charged with developing
practices that comply with disparate impact’s requirements.
Unfortunately, the goal of maximizing workforce productivity while
reducing or eliminating disparate impact has proven elusive.
Indeed, the literature consistently demonstrates that, given current
realities, the most effective job selection methods available show a
substantial adverse impact on non-Asian minorities, and in partic-
ular tend to screen out blacks. Moreover, the higher the predictive
validity of the metric used, the greater the racially disparate impact.
This inverse relationship between workforce productivity and racial
balance is known among IOP experts as the validity-diversity
tradeoff.103 There is now a consensus in the field that, over a wide
102. For example, the correlation between structured job interviews and subsequent job
performance ratings has been estimated as around .36. Michael A. Campion, James E.
Campion & J. Peter Hudson, Jr., Structured Interviewing: A Note on Incremental and
Alternative Question Types, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 998, 1000 (1994). The predictive
correlation of work performance with other methods, including situational assessments, tests
of job knowledge, and performance of sample job tasks, is similar in magnitude. For a survey
of methods and correlations, see Borman, Hanson & Hedge, supra note 93, at 314-17; Calvin
C. Hoffman & George C. Thornton III, Examining Selection Utility Where Competing
Predictors Differ in Adverse Impact, 50 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 455, 456-57 (1997); Sackett &
Lievens, supra note 96, at 431; see also Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 134
(discussing validities for various job selection methods and the need for further research).
103. See, e.g., Wilfried De Corte, Weighing Job Performance Predictors to Both Maximize
the Quality of the Selected Workforce and Control the Level of Adverse Impact, 84 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 695, 700 (1999) (noting the difficulty of identifying a job selection approach that
controls the level of racially adverse impact without “neglect[ing] the goal of maximizing the
quality of the selected workforce”); Hattrup & Roberts, supra note 87, at 161-65 (describing
the validity-diversity tradeoff as a pervasive empirical feature of IOP research and practice);
Keith M. Pyburn, Jr., Robert E. Ployhart & David A. Kravitz, The Diversity-Validity Dilemma:
Overview and Legal Context, 61 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 143, 145 (2008) (“Unfortunately, many
of the most predictive [knowledge, skill, and ability measures] and predictor methods (for
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range of real-world conditions, this tradeoff is an unavoidable
feature of personnel practice.104
The difficulty of finding selection methods that predict job success
while avoiding racially adverse impact is a product of two estab-
lished social science facts. First, as already noted, the IOP literature
has repeatedly documented that general intellectual ability, or g,
although imperfectly correlated with success on the job, is the most
powerful predictor of job performance over a wide range of occupa-
tions, from the least to the most demanding. Thus, as a general rule,
the more g-loaded a job screen, the more predictive of job success. As
a result, many commonly used selection methods have a significant
correlation with cognitive ability. 
Second, there is a longstanding gap in the average performance
of blacks and whites on measures of general intelligence, or IQ. The
magnitude of this disparity, which has been repeatedly documented
within the IOP field and has been fairly stable for decades, stands
at about one standard deviation from the mean.105 This gap has
example, assessment centers) produce varying degrees of mean subgroup differences, with
racio-ethnic minority groups usually scoring lower than majority groups.”); see also Schmitt,
Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 134 (describing the pervasive problem in personnel
practice of “[t]he conflict between equal representation of different groups and the
achievement of maximum expected productivity”).
104. See, e.g., Paul R. Sackett, Neal Schmitt, Jill E. Ellingson & Melissa B. Kabin, High-
Stakes Testing in Employment, Credentialing, and Higher Education: Prospects in a Post-
Affirmative Action World, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 302, 302 (2001) (summarizing conclusions
from a review of the IOP literature and noting that “it is unreasonable to expect that one can
maximize both the performance and ethnic diversity of selected individuals”); id. at 303
(“What quickly becomes clear [from the research] is that these two values—performance and
diversity—come into conflict. Increasing emphasis on the use of tests in the interest of gaining
enhanced performance has predictable negative consequences for the selection of Blacks and
Hispanics.”); id. at 314 (noting the “tension between pursuing a validity-maximization
strategy and a diversity-maximization strategy”); see also id. at 315 (noting that the observed
“subgroup differences on cognitively loaded tests of knowledge, skill, ability, and
achievement,” and the resulting validity-diversity tradeoff, “simply document persistent
[background] inequities”).
105. See, e.g., Leaetta M. Hough, Frederick L. Oswald & Robert E. Ployhart, Determinants,
Detection and Amelioration of Adverse Impact in Personnel Selection Procedures: Issues,
Evidence and Lessons Learned, 9 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 152, 153 (2001)
(“Regarding general intelligence, the commonly accepted mean difference between Blacks and
Whites is about one standard deviation, with Blacks scoring lower than Whites.”); Kelman,
supra note 63, at 1158 (“As a group, blacks score significantly lower on ‘general ability’ tests
than do whites.”); Philip L. Roth, Craig A. Bevier, Philip Bobko, Fred S. Switzer III & Peggy
Tyler, Ethnic Group Differences in Cognitive Ability in Employment and Educational Settings:
A Meta-Analysis, 54 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 318 (2001) (describing data showing that Hispanics
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important consequences for personnel practice and policy. The
combination of documented racial differences in cognitive ability
and the consistent link between ability and job performance means
that most valid job selection devices will show a racially adverse
impact and will disproportionately screen out blacks.106
In the wake of the Griggs decision, cognitive ability tests have
been targeted for criticism and legal challenge based on their
adverse impact on black job applicants. Although “pure” tests of
ability survive in some quarters,107 their use has diminished sig-
nificantly.108 Nonetheless, minimizing or eliminating reliance on
general ability tests has not solved the adverse impact problem.
Group disparities in other criteria, such as educational biodata,
outcomes of job interviews, or scores on tests of job skills and
lag behind whites by about 0.72 standard deviations on standard cognitive tests, as compared
to 1 standard deviation for blacks); Paul R. Sackett & Steffanie L. Wilk, Within-Group
Norming and Other Forms of Score Adjustments in Preemployment Testing, 49 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 929, 929 (1994) (“Black-White differences of approximately 1.0 standard
deviation units and Hispanic-White differences of approximately 0.6-0.8 standard deviation
units have been widely and consistently reported for measures of cognitive ability.”); Sackett,
Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, supra note 104, at 302 (noting that “test score distributions
consistently reveal significant mean differences” by race, and that “Blacks tend to score
approximately one standard deviation lower than Whites, and Hispanics score approximately
two thirds of a standard deviation lower than Whites”). For a discussion of black-white
differences in IQ and standard deviation measurements, see Kelman, supra note 63, at 192
n.91. See also Goldstein, Scherbaum & Yusko, supra note 97, at 120 (discussing majority-
minority differences in performance on tests of general intelligence).
106. See Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, supra note 104, at 302 (noting that mean
differences in test scores “can translate into [a] large adverse impact against protected groups
when test scores are used in selection and credentialing decision-making”).
107. See WAYNE L. FOX, JOHN E. TAYLOR & JOHN S. CAYLOR, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV.
HUMAN RES. RESEARCH OFFICE, APTITUDE LEVEL AND THE ACQUISITION OF SKILLS AND
KNOWLEDGES IN A VARIETY OF MILITARY TRAINING TASKS vi (1969); Philip Crewson, A
Comparative Analysis of Public and Private Sector Entrant Quality, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 628,
633 (1995) (describing the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) as a general ability test
“used by the military not only as a measure of trainability and future performance but also
as a general indicator of recruit quality”); Malcolm James Ree & Thomas R. Carretta, Central
Role of g in Military Pilot Selection, 6 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 111, 111-13 (1996). For more
on armed forces screening tests, their reliance on measures of cognitive ability, and their
racially disparate impact, see infra note 256.
108. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing black college
graduates’ challenge to the general ability Federal Service Entrance Examination (FSEE));
Hunter & Schmidt, supra note 97, at 466 (1996) (acknowledging a decline in the use of pure
intelligence tests for job screening); Kelman, supra note 63, at 1204-05 (discussing the
General Ability Test Battery (GATB), used for many years by the U.S. Employment Service
to screen and rank prospective federal government workers but now defunct). 
2011] DISPARATE IMPACT REALISM 647
knowledge, although somewhat smaller than for standard tests of
intelligence or IQ, are still fairly substantial—and substantial
enough routinely to run afoul of disparate impact’s threshold guide-
lines. 
In describing observed patterns, the IOP literature refers to the
standardized difference between two comparison groups (designated
as “d”) associated with a given predictor of job performance.109
Measured d values of commonly used screens vary substantially,
with the largest gaps reported between blacks and white job can-
didates and smaller disparities for Hispanics. Values range from the
black-white gap of one standard deviation commonly reported for
tests of cognitive ability, to significantly lower to negligible racial
differences for some kinds of personality tests. Most d values fall
somewhere in between, with more heavily g-loaded, or ability-
dependent, measures showing greater group differences.110 
A broad consensus has emerged among IOP experts that group
disparities in scores on predictive job screens are not just an artifact
of measurement. Rather, the numbers reflect the distribution of
developed abilities and human capital in American society. In addi-
tion to group disparities in tests of cognitive ability, significant
109. Denise Potosky, Philip Bobko & Philip Roth, Forming Composites of Cognitive Ability
and Alternative Measures To Predict Job Performance and Reduce Adverse Impact: Corrected
Estimates and Realistic Expectations, 13 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 304, 305 (2005)
(“The d statistic is computed by subtracting the mean of the focal minority group from the
mean of the majority group in the numerator. The denominator is the sample-weighted
average standard deviation of the minority and majority groups. For example, a d of 0.5
indicates that the majority group scored, on average, one half of an averaged standard
deviation higher than the minority group.”).
110. For a review of the racially adverse impact of commonly used screening methods, see
Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 118-28 (reporting a range of values for blacks
and hispanics); see also Pyburn, Ployhart & Kravitz, supra note 103, at 143-47; Roth, Bevier,
Bobko, Switzer & Tyler, supra note 105, at 297-99. On the disparate impact of structured
interviews, see Allen I. Huffcutt & Philip L. Roth, Racial Group Differences in Employment
Interview Evaluations, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 179, 179-81 (1998); Philip L. Roth, Chad H.
Van Iddekinge, Allen I. Huffcutt, Carl E. Eidson Jr. & Philip Bobko, Corrections for Range
Restriction in Structured Interview Ethnic Group Differences: The Values May Be Larger Than
Researchers Thought, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 369, 369-72 (2002). On racial differences in
problem solving exercises and job simulations, see Michelle A. Dean, Philip L. Roth & Philip
Bobko, Ethnic and Gender Subgroup Differences in Assessment Center Ratings: A Meta-
Analysis, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 685, 685-86, 688-89 (2008) (from a meta-analysis of
assessment center data, noting d values of 0.52 for blacks and 0.28 for Hispanics, as compared
to whites, which are smaller than cognitive ability disparities but sufficient to trigger
disparate impact scrutiny in many cases).
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differences exist in other indicia of learning, aptitude, and achieve-
ment. The black-white test score gap at all levels of schooling is
persistent and substantial and has been a topic of concern and
discussion for some time. For example, according to scores on a 2009
national test of achievement, the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress (NAEP), the average black twelfth-grade student
reads at an eighth-grade level.111 Blacks are consistently observed
to enter elementary school, high school, college, graduate school,
and professional education with lower test scores, grades, measures
of learning and achievement, and proficiency levels than whites.112
Thus, blacks and whites with an equivalent amount of education
and training and similar years of schooling show marked perfor-
mance disparities, with blacks on average lagging systematically
behind.113 
The differences in ability and achievement have concrete con-
sequences for how well people perform in the workplace.114 IOP
research reveals that the achievement gap does not stop at the
schoolhouse door. Although there is disagreement on the precise
111. Eric Hanushek, How Well Do We Understand Achievement Gaps?, FOCUS, Winter
2010, at 5.
112. See id. at 6-7 (“[P]erformance appears roughly flat for almost four decades.... The
analysis vividly underscored the huge difference in the achievement of students by race and
background.... The magnitude of the gap is stunning.”); see also THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE &
ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN
ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND CAMPUS LIFE 226-29 (2009) (providing data on group
differences in scores and academic achievement); AMY L. WAX, RACE, WRONGS AND REMEDIES:
GROUP JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 47-52 (2009) (discussing racial gaps in educational
performance). For a review of scholarship on this issue, see Richard C. Hunter & RoSusan
Bartee, The Achievement Gap: Issues of Competition, Class, and Race, 35 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y
151, 154-56 (2003).
113. For example, a recent report on college readiness among high school graduates in New
York State reveals that 51 percent of whites and 56 percent of Asian Americans completing
high school statewide are “college ready,” whereas only 13 percent of black students and 15
percent of Hispanic students were deemed prepared for college level courses after graduation.
See Sharon Otterman, 37 Percent of New York Graduates Are College-Ready, Data Show, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A23. The psychologist Richard Nisbett reports on a study showing
that, among a cohort of new high school graduates who eventually completed college, blacks
scored 1 standard deviation below whites on an IQ test. RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE
AND HOW TO GET IT 147 (2009). When the students were tested again at the end of college, the
measured gap was 0.4 standard deviation. Id.
114. See Hanushek, supra note 111, at 6 (“[S]tudies provide very consistent estimates of
the impact of test performance on earnings of young workers ... [with] even larger returns to
achievement ... for a more age-representative sample.” (footnote omitted)).
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magnitude of the disparities, with variation based on methodology,
type of position, job selectivity, and other parameters,115 evidence
from direct measures of actual job performance shows fairly
consistent racial gaps. On average, black workers lag behind whites
in job performance by roughly 0.3, or a bit less than a third of a
standard deviation across a spectrum of jobs,116 with one meta-
analysis estimating the gap as between 0.24 and 0.39 standard
deviations.117 This gap would appear larger than expected, given
that most employers try to select workers with similar qualifica-
tions, including job-relevant background and level of education.118
Indeed, years of education and degrees completed have emerged as
important and widely used personnel filters. Yet racial gaps in job
performance persist. These results reflect documented differences
in actual academic achievement, which are independent of years of
schooling and degrees completed. Because many jobs draw on skills
learned in school, it should not be surprising that measures of
learning and academic mastery, such as grades and test scores, are
predictive of job success.119 The harsh reality is that more capable
115. See Patrick F. McKay & Michael A. McDaniel, A Reexamination of Black-White Mean
Differences in Work Performance: More Data, More Moderators, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 538,
548-50 (2006); see also McKay, supra note 97, at 251-52. 
116. See, e.g., Outtz & Newman, supra note 97, at 77 (noting “average race differences
around d = 0.3 for a variety of job performance measures”); see also Frank Landy, Performance
Ratings: Then and Now, in ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 227, 230-35 (summarizing
range of studies of racial differences in job performance); Philip L. Roth, Allen I. Huffcutt &
Philip Bobko, Ethnic Group Differences in Measures of Job Performance: A New Meta-
Analysis, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 694, 702 (2003) (noting that blacks lag behind whites in
measured job performance ratings); Paul R. Sackett, Matthew J. Borneman & Brian S.
Connelly, High-Stakes Testing in Higher Education and Employment, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
215, 223 (2008); Sackett & Lievens, supra note 96, at 435; Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at
934 (noting reported black-white differences in job performance as approximately 0.3-0.4
standard deviations, with values perhaps higher when corrected for measurement error). Most
data focuses on black-white differences, although evidence on Hispanics has also been
collected. See, e.g., Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 943-44; Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos,
supra note 96, at 121-22.
117. See McKay & McDaniel, supra note 115, at 538; see also McKay, supra note 97, at 251.
118. See supra Part II.A (discussing biodata as an important screening device).
119. See, e.g., Philip L. Roth & Philip Bobko, College Grade Point Average as a Personnel
Selection Device: Ethnic Group Differences and Potential Adverse Impact, 85 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 399, 399 (2000) (discussing predictive power of grades and school achievement for
job performance); Sackett, Borneman & Connelly, supra note 116, at 215 (noting that tests
of developed intellectual ability are valid predictors of academic as well as occupational
performance).
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people tend to perform better at work, and that minorities—most
notably blacks and to a lesser degree Hispanics—know less and
possess fewer skills, on average, than whites and Asians across a
number of domains that reflect modern workplace demands. Those
shortfalls in turn influence ratings on criteria used to determine
hiring and promotion. In other words, the reason that valid job
predictors—which are factors correlated to some extent with
observed job outcomes—tend to show a racially disparate impact is
that there are real group differences in what is being predicted:
actual ability to do the job. 
An analysis of the sources of these patterns is beyond the scope
of this Article. As one commentator notes, “there are many realistic
disadvantages that distinguish racial subgroups, and these disad-
vantages logically have some implications for job performance.”120
Factors thought to contribute to underdeveloped human capital
among racial minorities include historical discrimination, conditions
of upbringing, family structure, poverty, schooling quality, neighbor-
hood, and culture.121 
In sum, the tendency of valid job selection methods to screen out
minorities is traceable to underlying group differences that correlate
with ability to function in the workplace. Regardless of the sources
of these differences, the validity-diversity tradeoff reflects an
unfortunate reality with predictable consequences for personnel
selection—consequences that are hard or impossible to avoid.
Although “[p]ersonnel psychologists ... have devoted considerable
effort to identifying test and test presentation strategies that reduce
120. Outtz & Newman, supra note 97, at 84-85; see also Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson &
Kabin, supra note 104, at 315 (noting that subgroup differences in performance “simply
document persisting inequities”).
121. See, e.g., George Farkas, Cognitive Skills and Noncognitive Traits and Behaviors in
Stratification Processes, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 541, 544-47 (2003) (noting the contribution of
differential family investments, economic circumstances, cultural style, and other factors to
racial gaps in human capital development); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define
It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979, 998-1002 (2008) (noting socio-demographic differences
between blacks and whites that could account for disparities in skill development and thus
lead to average group differences in occupational success); see also Reva B. Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases,
120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1320-21 & nn.128-29 (2011) (“[D]isparate impact’s critics are inclined to
interpret the underrepresentation of minorities as evidence of racial group differences in taste
or aptitude.”).
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adverse impact,” they have found that “few strategies have elimi-
nated adverse impact.”122 
That has not prevented IOP experts from trying, however. Efforts
to circumvent the validity-diversity tradeoff have spawned a volu-
minous literature. In attempting to develop novel screens with a
smaller disparate impact, researchers have pursued a number of
approaches and relied on various observations in the field. The
evidence suggests, for example, that supervisors value both “task
performance,” which relates to carrying out core work requirements,
and “contextual performance,” or “organizational citizenship,” which
depends on cooperative and pro-social behaviors on the job.123 Task
performance is more dependent on cognitive ability, for which racial
differences are relatively large, whereas citizenship is a function of
other attributes, such as personality and integrity, for which group
differences are negligible or nonexistent.124 In addition, minorities
are known to lag significantly behind whites in scores on conven-
tional paper-and-pencil tests that draw heavily on reading and
written communication skills.125 Based on these observations, IOP
experts have worked to formulate sophisticated, multi-step “compos-
ite” assessments that place greater weight on personality attributes
122. Zedeck, supra note 50, at 22.
123. See, e.g., Philip Bobko, Philip L. Roth & Denise Potosky, Derivation and Implications
of a Meta-Analytic Matrix Incorporating Cognitive Ability, Alternate Predictors, and Job
Performance, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 561, 562 (1999) (noting the role of “contextual
performance factors” or “organizational citizenship behaviors” in worker assessments); Keith
Hattrup, Joanna Rock & Christine Scalia, The Effects of Varying Conceptualizations of Job
Performance on Adverse Impact, Minority Hiring and Predicted Performance, 82 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 656, 657 (1997) (discussing dimensions of measured job performance and
distinguishing between “task performance”—going to the “technical core” of the job—and
“contextual performance”—which reflects support of the organization’s “climate and culture”
and the display of “helping, prosocial, and citizenship behaviors”); Kevin R. Murphy, How a
Broader Definition of the Criterion Domain Changes Our Thinking About Adverse Impact, in
ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 137, 141 (“[T]he domain of job performance includes a wide
range of behaviors, such as teamwork, customer service, and organizational citizenship, that
are not always necessary to accomplish the specific tasks in an individual’s job but are
necessary for the smooth functioning of teams and organizations.”).
124. See McKay & McDaniel, supra note 115, at 540 (noting larger racial differences for
task performance, which is more ability based, than for contextual performance, which is
dependent on extra-role and prosocial behaviors); McKay, supra note 97, at 253-54 (“[C]riteria
that are highly dependent on cognitive ability will exhibit larger black-white mean disparities
than those more contingent on personality.”). 
125. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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like conscientiousness and integrity than on conventional measures
of cognitive acumen. Alternatively, they have devised “tests that
[are] more interactive, behaviorally-oriented, and orally- or aurally-
oriented,”126 such as simulations or real-time problem-solving
exercises (as often employed at job assessment centers).127
The goal of this research is to reduce disparate impact while
maintaining the predictive power of screening instruments.
Although the details of this quest are technical, the conclusions can
be summarized succinctly. Despite extensive and strenuous efforts
to circumvent the validity-diversity tradeoff, the project has failed.
As a practical matter, adverse impact cannot readily be reduced
without sacrificing either accuracy or predictive validity.128 Novel
methods that minimize reliance on written communication and
attempt to simulate real work situations still show considerable
126. Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 126.
127. For a comprehensive review of attempts to develop innovative job screening protocols
that maintain validity while reducing adverse impact, see id. Job assessment centers have
received a good deal of play as a possible means to circumvent the validity-diversity tradeoff,
and are the subject of an extensive literature as well as discussion in the case law. See, e.g.,
IOP Brief, supra note 58, at 28-33. The research shows that, although assessment center
protocols can somewhat reduce race gaps, they do not eliminate adverse impact. See Winifred
Arthur, Jr., Eric Anthony Day, Theresa L. McNelly & Pamela S. Edens, A Meta-Analysis of
the Criterion-Related Validity of Assessment Center Dimensions, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 125,
125 (2003); Kobi Dayan, Ronen Kasten & Shaul Fox, Entry-Level Police Candidate Assessment
Center: An Efficient Tool or a Hammer To Kill a Fly?, 55 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 827, 827
(2002); Dean, Roth & Bobko, supra note 110, at 685; Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton & Bentson,
supra note 96, at 503-04; Eran Hermlin, Filip Lievens & Ivan T. Robertson, The Validity of
Assessment Centres for the Prediction of Supervisory Performance Ratings: A Meta-Analysis,
15 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 405, 405 (2007); see also Tippins, supra note 50, at 218
(discussing the greater costs of using assessment centers, which are cumbersome and labor-
intensive devices). 
128. See, e.g., De Corte, supra note 103, at 700 (discussing the difficulty of developing new
approaches to job selection that control the level of racially adverse impact without
“neglect[ing] the goal of maximizing the quality of the selected workforce”); Paul R. Sackett
& Lawrence Roth, Multi-Stage Selection Strategies: A Monte Carlo Investigation of Effects on
Performance and Minority Hiring, 49 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 549, 567-71 (1996) (noting the
potential for complex and multi-factorial selection practices to achieve small reductions in
group differences without major sacrifices in validity, but only under rare and specialized
conditions that are difficult to predict or identify systematically ahead of time); Neal Schmitt
et al., Adverse Impact and Predictive Efficiency of Various Predictor Combinations, 82 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 719, 723 (1997) (analyzing alternative composite job predictors and
reporting that in most instances “d remains high with the addition [to cognitively loaded
factors] of predictors with smaller levels of d, and in many cases d for the composite exceeds
that of cognitive ability alone”).
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disparities by race.129 Adding additional predictors or fiddling with
their weight has not solved the dilemma, nor have job screens that
de-emphasize cognitive skills and rely on traits like conscientious-
ness, agreeableness or integrity. Although those attributes correlate
with good “job citizenship,” and thus have some bearing on worker
performance ratings, the fact remains that they are significantly
less important to overall performance than cognitive ability and
that the instruments for measuring them are less reliable and pre-
cise.130 Consequently, combining more cognitively loaded with less
cognitively loaded metrics can modestly reduce disparate impact
without compromising validity only in exceptional cases.131 More
generally, a selection method that boosts minority representation
will almost certainly reduce workplace productivity unless the
129. See, e.g., Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, supra note 104, at 315 (noting that
altering the mode of assessment, including adopting methods that “reduc[e] the verbal
component (or reading level) of tests, may have a positive effect on subgroup differences,
although d is often still large enough to produce adverse impact”).
130. See John M. Avis, Jeffrey D. Kudisch & Vincent J. Fortunato, Examining the
Incremental Validity and Adverse Impact of Cognitive Ability and Conscientiousness on Job
Performance, 17 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 87, 87 (2002) (finding that selecting for conscientiousness
in hiring for a large home improvement organization, although providing some incremental
validity when added to cognitive ability, failed to ameliorate the significant adverse impact
associated with that cognitive ability component); Hattrup, Rock & Scalia, supra note 123, at
657, 660 (noting that, because general intelligence is more strongly related to job performance
than any other trait, screens that de-emphasize ability can reduce disparate impact while still
maintaining validity only in unselective situations and for jobs that greatly stress
“citizenship” over “task performance”); Ones, Viswesvaran & Schmidt, supra note 101, at 694
(noting that integrity tests predict job performance with only “moderate” validity); Elaine D.
Pulakos & Neal Schmitt, An Evaluation of Two Strategies for Reducing Adverse Impact and
Their Effects on Criterion-Related Validity, 9 HUM. PERFORMANCE 241, 253, 255 (1996)
(describing a composite broad-based skill assessment with less disparate impact than
standard job tests and other more cognitively based screens but which still yields significant
adverse impact at selective hiring ratios below 80 percent of applicants; also observing that
“one cannot expect substantial reductions in subgroup differences even when one adds new
measures for which there are no or minimal subgroup differences to a [valid] measure that
exhibits large subgroup differences”); Paul R. Sackett, Wilfried De Corte & Filip Lievens,
Decision Aids for Addressing the Validity-Adverse Impact Trade-Off, in ADVERSE IMPACT,
supra note 50, at 453, 457-59 (noting the limited to null potential for composite and novel
predictors combining low and high adverse impact instruments to reduce overall disparate
impact and maintain predictive validity). 
131. See Hattrup, Rock & Scalia, supra note 123, at 660, 662 (claiming to find a method
that maintains validity while reducing adverse impact below the level that violates the four-
fifths rule, but only for those rare specialized jobs, such as sales, that are significantly more
dependent on citizenship-related factors than g-related factors, and only when selection is
relatively uncompetitive, that is, when more than 80 percent of applicants are hired).
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selection ratio is very high—that is, only if most or all applicants are
hired.132 
In sum, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reduce reliance on
intelligence-based screens or diminish the weight assigned to g-
related measures, without compromising the ability to predict who
is likely to succeed on the job. Likewise, minimizing adverse impact
almost always dilutes the reliability and predictive power of the
selection process. Although cognitive ability is not the only factor
that determines job success, it is the most important factor. It is also
easy to measure, and the instruments used to gauge it are well
developed, reliable, and precise. Therefore, omitting or downplaying
g-related measures in a competitive business environment almost
always results in a less productive workforce. And that workforce
will be chosen at far greater expense, because proposed alternatives
to g-loaded tests are notoriously cumbersome, time consuming, and
expensive.133 In sum, efforts to develop new personnel practices that
circumvent the validity-diversity tradeoff have failed. For most
commonly encountered situations, the tradeoff is unavoidable. 
Although the research overwhelmingly supports this conclusion,
the case law resists. The argument is repeatedly made that written
civil service exams, or existing protocols that heavily weight such
exams for hiring and promoting police and firefighters, are unac-
ceptable because these methods are not the best available. Rather,
there exist equally or more valid screens with less adverse impact
that, according to the legal doctrine, employers must adopt in lieu
of existing procedures.134 The premise operating here is that the
validity-diversity tradeoff can easily be overcome. 
In the context of litigation over civil service jobs, the focus is often
on the assertion that selection devices that de-emphasize or ignore
132. See, e.g., Sackett, De Corte & Lievens, supra note 130, at 455 tbl.17.1; Paul R. Sackett
& Jill E. Ellingson, The Effects of Forming Multi-Predictor Composites on Group Differences
and Adverse Impact, 50 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 707, 712 tbl.2 (1997); see also Schmitt, Clause
& Pulakos, supra note 96, at 117 (reviewing results for alternative job screening methods and
protocols).
133. See Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson & Kabin, supra note 104, at 315 (“Complicating
matters further, attempts to overcome issues associated with reliable measurement [of job-
related skills] often result in a testing procedure that is cost-prohibitive when conducted on
a large scale.”); see also Tippins, supra note 50, at 218 (noting that assessment center
evaluations are cumbersome, costly, and labor-intensive).
134. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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key criteria—such as “command presence” in the case of firefighter
supervisors—are inferior predictors of job success.135 The use of
written tests rather than simulations of actual task performance is
thus seen as presumptively less valid and less able to identify the
most effective workers. In this vein, respondents and their experts
in Ricci v. DeStefano argued that equally effective but less discrimi-
natory promotional methods were available to the city. These
included job simulations and assessment center procedures that
placed more emphasis on oral measures of leadership skills and
“command presence.”136 Nonetheless, no actual empirical support for
this proposition was offered in any of the materials before the
courts, including the Supreme Court amicus brief for the respon-
dents in Ricci filed by five individual IOP specialists.137 In particu-
lar, no specific studies or data were adduced for the assertion that
the proposed alternative selection methods were as good or better
predictors of firefighter captain performance than the civil service
tests at issue in the Ricci case.138
The notion that the written test in Ricci was inadequate for its
failure to measure key attributes of the firefighter’s job is based on
a misguided “construct fallacy”: the notion that measures of
“constructs” or traits peculiarly associated with specific types of
work are the best predictors of occupational success. Although this
notion has powerful intuitive appeal and is often asserted in
discussions of disparate impact,139 it is fallacious. Voluminous
evidence, accumulated over a long period, indicates that almost all
jobs rely more heavily on general cognitive ability than on other
skills.140 Cognitive ability is the most effective predictor of occupa-
tional success for a broad range of jobs, from most to least demand-
ing.141 Moreover, the psychometric data indicate that this skill is
most effectively measured through written tests of analysis and
135. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 126.
136. See id. at 155; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2695 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); IOP Brief, supra note 58, at 28-33; Norton, supra note 75, at 252. 
137. IOP Brief, supra note 58, at 28-33.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Op-Ed., Trial by Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2009, at A19 (stating, without research citation, that paper-and-pencil tests are not good
predictors of actual performance in public emergency service jobs).
140. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 97, 102 and accompanying text.
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learning.142 Accordingly, the notion that the best candidates for a
fire captain position cannot be identified without gauging attributes
like “command presence” or leadership skill is a product of wishful
thinking unsupported by hard data or empirical research. No known
studies demonstrate that evaluating leadership or “command pres-
ence” is superior to g-loaded tests or screens in predicting success in
firefighter supervisory positions, and much evidence suggests the
contrary. Nor is there reason to believe that adding leadership
assessments to the mix or giving greater weight to noncognitive
skills will decrease adverse impact to acceptable levels while
increasing, or at least not sacrificing, validity. The assertion that
protocols that place substantial weight on measures of leadership or
“command presence” predict fire captain performance better with
less adverse impact finds no support in empirical studies and indeed
stands in stark opposition to the voluminous literature on the
validity-diversity tradeoff. That literature reports on the near im-
possibility of devising alternatives to conventional written measures
of cognitive ability, analytic skill, or knowledge that better predict
job success under real world conditions.143 Indeed, existing research
reveals that assessment center batteries, which are repeatedly
touted as a superior alternative to written civil service exams and
have been widely adopted for screening police and firefighters,144
generally correlate with performance at the level of about .25-.39,145
which compares unfavorably with the .5-.6 validities associated with
heavily g-loaded screens.146 And although performance on assess-
ment center exercises shows less adverse impact on minorities,
group disparities are still pronounced.147 
142. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; supra note 127.
144. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2705 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(observing that nearly two-thirds of surveyed municipalities used assessment centers
(“simulations of the real world of work”) as part of their promotion processes); see also Harris
& West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 155 n.290.
145. See Arthur, Day, McNelly & Edens, supra note 127, at 125.
146. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the validities of g-loaded
screening mechanisms).
147. See supra note 127 and accompanying text; see also Dean, Roth & Bobko, supra note
110, at 688. The Industrial-Organizational Psychologists brief in Ricci filed by five individual
experts asserts that, because New Haven’s firefighter promotional exam did not purport
directly to measure “command presence” and leadership skills, the city failed in its duty to
make use of a more valid but less discriminatory alternative. See IOP Brief, supra note 58,
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III. SQUARING THE CIRCLE: COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF DISPARATE IMPACT
These observations bode ill for employers’ efforts to comply with
the disparate impact rule. The present reality of group differences,
and the intransigence of the validity-diversity tradeoff, mean that
even modestly useful personnel selection criteria will screen out too
many minorities most of the time. Achieving racial balance will
prove difficult or impossible for jobs that are moderately selective,
and imposing even mildly demanding skill-based hurdles will often
produce a workforce that leaves employers vulnerable to a disparate
impact challenge. Of course, being sued does not necessarily trans-
late into liability. But it does force employers to defend their prac-
tices as job-related or consistent with business necessity. The
practical difficulties and uncertainties inherent in establishing this
defense impose a costly burden on employers—one which, under
present social conditions, they should not have to bear, and which
runs the risk of distorting their practices and incentives. Even
absent that result, the pursuit of disparate impact claims will, at
most, have only marginal effects on workplace diversity. If the
courts do their job and apply the disparate impact doctrine correctly,
almost all adverse racial impacts will be found to be justified and
workplace demographics will remain virtually unchanged. The mag-
nitude of existing group differences in job-related skills is large
enough to account for the underrepresentation of minorities across
the workforce. That reality, and not arbitrary employment hurdles,
is the principal source of workplace imbalances and employers’
failure to comply with the four-fifths rule.
The IOP literature yields crucial insights into the constraints
under which businesses operate in managing their workforce while
simultaneously striving to meet diversity targets. Given the magni-
at 28-33. Although the brief quotes experts opining on this point, it cites no actual studies
supporting the alleged superiority of the proposed alternatives to the type of paper-and-pencil
civil service exam administered by the city in that case and adduces no evidence for the
proposition that such alternatives select more effective supervisors. Rather, the experts as
well as respondents, rely heavily on the fact that many other cities make use of the assess-
ment center option. Id. at 30-31. It should be obvious that this fact alone fails to establish the
superior validity of proposed alternatives. 
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tude of current group differences in performance on common selec-
tion criteria and in underlying proficiency, a broad range of valid
and common personnel practices will routinely produce violations of
disparate impact standards. Indeed, the IOP research makes clear
that all screening procedures except the least selective and most
weakly predictive can be expected to fall short of satisfying the four-
fifths rule.148 Although the four-fifths standard appears reasonable
on the assumption of equal job readiness, it is far too stringent in
light of the actual distribution of human capital. Performance gaps
are currently so large that only a substantial narrowing of existing
disparities would alleviate this situation. As leading researchers in
the field have observed, “[i]t is informative, though perhaps dis-
heartening, to note that even d [group performance difference]
values commonly viewed as small [for example 0.2] can produce
violations of the four-fifths rule at a variety of commonly occurring
[job] selection ratios.”149 Because average d values frequently exceed
0.2, meritocratic staffing practices will routinely fall short of the
four-fifths target. 
This observation can be demonstrated through simple calcula-
tions from data readily available in the IOP literature. Paul Sackett
and his colleagues have performed such calculations and assembled
the results in a table that summarizes the relationship between
relevant parameters.150 The table in Figure 1A sets out the expected
ratio of hiring from a minority group (for example, blacks) relative
to a majority group (whites) as a function of the selectivity of a job
(percentage hired relative to applicants) and the performance of
blacks compared to whites on a job screening test. The goal is to
select persons who are equally qualified, in the sense of exceeding
a threshold level of performance on a job screen, regardless of group
identity. 
148. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text; supra note 131.
149. Sackett & Ellingson, supra note 132, at 712. 
150. See, e.g., Sackett, De Corte & Lievens, supra note 130, at 455 tbl.17.1; see also Sackett
& Ellingson, supra note 132, at 712 tbl.2.
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Figure 1A:151 Minority Group Selection Ratios and Four-Fifths Ratios When the
Majority Group Selection Ratio Is 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, or 99%
Standardized 
group 
difference (d)
Majority group selection ratio
1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%
0.0   .010  .050  .100  .250  .500  .750  .900  .950  .990
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.1  .008   .041  .084  .221  .460  .716  .881  .938  .987
 .80  .82  .84  .88  .92  .95  .98  .99  .99
0.2  .006  .033   .069  .192  .421  .681  .860  .925  .983
 .60  .66  .69  .77  .84  .91  .96  .97  .99
0.3  .004  .026  .057  .166  .382  .644  .837  .910  .978
 .40  .52  .57  .66  .76  .86  .93  .96  .99
0.4  .003  .021  .046  .142  .345  .606  .811  .893  .973
 .30  .42  .46  .57  .69  .81  .90  .94  .98
0.5  .002  .016  .038  .121  .309  .568  .782  .873  .966
 .20  .32  .38  .48  .62  .76  .87  .92  .98
0.6  .002  .013  .030  .102  .274  .528  .752  .851  .957
 .20  .26  .30  .41  .55  .70  .84  .90  .97
0.7  .001  .010  .024  .085  .242  .488  .719  .826  .947
 .10  .20  .24  .34  .48  .65  .80  .87  .96
0.8  .001  .007  .019  .071  .212  .448  .684  .800  .936
 .10  .14  .19  .28  .42  .60  .76  .84  .95
0.9  .001  .006  .015  .058  .184  .409  .648  .770  .922
 .10  .12  .15  .23  .37  .54  .72  .81  .93
1.0  .000  .004  .011  .047  .159  .371  .610  .739  .907
 .00  .08  .11  .19  .32  .49  .68  .78  .92
1.1  .000  .003  .009  .038  .136  .334  .571  .705  .889
 .00  .06  .09  .15  .27  .45  .63  .74  .90
1.2  .000  .002  .007  .031  .115  .298  .532  .670  .869
 .00  .04  .07  .12  .23  .40  .59  .71  .88
1.3  .000  .002  .005  .024  .097  .264  .492  .633  .846
 .00  .04  .05  .10  .19  .35  .55  .67  .85
1.4  .000  .001  .004  .019  .081  .233  .452  .595  .821
 .00  .02  .04  .08  .16  .31  .50  .63  .83
1.5  .000  .001  .003  .015  .067  .203  .413  .556  .794
 .00  .02  .03  .06  .13  .27  .46  .59  .80
151. See sources cited supra note 150. The table shows the minority selection ratio (number
hired/number applicants, non-bold number in each cell) and four-fifths ratio (minority
selection ratio/majority selection ratio, bold number in each cell) as a function of the majority
selection ratio (percent hired, from 1% to 99%, at top) and d (standardized group difference
in performance, at left). Tabled values in bold less than .80 represent scenarios that violate
the four-fifths rule.
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The parameters in Figure 1A reflect the fact that, when an
employer is seeking to hire the best qualified candidates based on
scores on a personnel screening device and two groups (for example,
blacks and whites) differ in the distribution of screening scores, the
hires from each group, and the corresponding hiring ratios, will be
a function of the magnitude of the group score differences as well as
the overall number of positions available. These relationships can
be determined from the pattern of two overlapping curves, as
depicted in Figure 2. Assuming that the curves in Figure 2 repre-
sent each group’s distribution of scores on a pre-job screen, the dis-
tance between curves will reflect the d value, or standard deviation
difference in scores, between the groups (A & B). Smaller d values
will show curves with more overlap; larger d values will show curves
farther apart. Assuming that candidates will be selected from the
top down, the cutoff score and the numbers hired (above the cutoff)
from each group will reflect positions available. As d increases,
fewer applicants will be hired from the lower scoring group (A)
relative to the higher scoring group (B). Likewise, the fraction of
candidates hired from each group will vary with the number of jobs
available. As positions become more scarce and the vertical line
moves to the right, the ratio of candidates selected from the lower
scoring group (A) relative to the higher (B) will decline. 
Figure 2: Distribution of Performance (Screening Criterion; or 
On-the-Job)
Group B
Group A
NOT HIRED   HIRED Ratio minority/majority hiring = A/B
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Corresponding to the relationships depicted graphically in Figure
2, the numbers in the body of Figure 1A represent the fraction of
hires and the minority-majority hiring ratio (the numbers in bold
type) expected in a competitive top-down selection process. Those
parameters are a function of (1) the observed value of d, or the
average standardized difference between the minority and majority
groups in performance on a job screen (left side of the table); and (2)
the selectivity of the job, as measured by the percentage of majority
group job applicants who are hired or promoted through the use of
a selection device (top of the table), which reflects the number of
jobs available. In sum, the table identifies the minority-majority
hiring ratios that would be expected in situations of varying selec-
tivity or competitiveness, as a function of observed group differences
in performance on job screening tests, if the employer seeks to
select similarly (and the best) qualified workers from each group.
Although the table does not incorporate data on the predictive value
of particular job screens, the calculated relationships hold for all
devices, regardless of validity. As already noted, estimates of the
validity of conventional job screens is available in the IOP litera-
ture, which also reports evidence on racial differences in perfor-
mance (d values) for those screens.152
An examination of this table yields some important insights.
First, for any degree of group disparity (d) in performance on a job
test, the expected ratio of minority group (black) to majority group
(white) hires is a function of the selectivity of the job (as reflected in
the percentage of job seekers hired from the majority group), which
in turn depends on the overall number of positions available relative
to applicants. As competitiveness increases (with fewer slots relative
to job seekers), the expected ratio of black to white hires declines,
and adverse impact increases.153 Second, the ratio of blacks to
whites hired varies with d, or the gap between whites and blacks in
152. See supra notes 97, 110 and accompanying text.
153. Accordingly, it is well recognized that placing significant weight on g-related
predictors, especially for competitive jobs for which a relatively small percentage of applicants
are hired, will severely limit or even eliminate minority hires. See, e.g., Neal Schmitt &
Abigail Quinn, Reductions in Measured Subgroup Mean Differences: What Is Possible?, in
ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at 425, 426 (“Selecting the highest-scoring individuals and
a small proportion of applicants ... will virtually eliminate members of lower-scoring
subgroups.”).
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the pertinent qualification, such as the score on a job screening test.
The greater the discrepancy—that is, the lower the average per-
formance for blacks compared to whites—the smaller the black to
white hiring ratio and the greater the adverse impact.
This analysis reveals an important defect in the four-fifths rule
as currently applied: the existing benchmark does not vary with job
selectivity—that is, the ratio of available job candidates to those
hired. A fixed ratio makes sense under the assumption implicit in
Griggs and its progeny, which is that there are no discrepancies in
expected job performance between groups.154 If all groups are
equally well qualified on average and will perform equally well in
most available positions, there is no need to vary the expected ratio
with selectivity, and job competitiveness will have no effect on the
relative number of hires from each demographic category. As noted,
the empirical evidence reveals that this assumption of equal job
readiness is unrealistic.155 When one group lags behind another in
actual performance, selectivity can significantly influence the ex-
pected hiring ratios from each group.156 Thus, a fixed ratio is an
inappropriate benchmark for creating a presumption of unlawful
(that is, arbitrary, non-job-related) disparate impact, because the
probability of justified (lawful and job-related) adverse impact will
vary depending on real-world group disparities in performance. 
The table in Figure 1A also shows that valid—and presumptively
legitimate—job screens, including those in common use, will rou-
tinely violate the four-fifths rule. The zig-zag line superimposed on
the table separates the combinations that satisfy the four-fifths rule
(above and to the right) from the more numerous ones that fall short
(below and to the left). Except for the least selective positions, the
group performance disparities reported in the IOP literature for
many job screens will generate hiring ratios below four-fifths. At the
extremes—for example, using a pure test of cognitive ability gener-
ating a typical black-white disparity (d) of one standard devia-
tion—only positions for which more than 95 percent of applicants
(that is, virtually all applicants) are hired would achieve the target
154. See supra Part I (explaining Griggs and the development of the four-fifths rule).
155. See supra Part II.B (discussing measured performance disparities between blacks and
whites).
156. See supra note 151.
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ratio. When fewer applicants are hired, the ratio of black to white
hires expected would always fall below the .8 fraction dictated by
the four-fifths rule. Thus, hiring from the top down based on such
a test would virtually always expose an employer to a possible
disparate impact challenge.157 
 As noted above, many selection devices show smaller group dis-
parities than cognitive ability tests. Nonetheless, if employers hire
the best candidates and applicants exceed positions, relatively few
persons from lower scoring groups will be selected. The data reveal
that the adverse impact for commonplace screening methods is still
large enough to run afoul of the four-fifths rule on a regular basis.
For instance, black-white d values as low as 0.25 have been reported
for structured interviews.158 For a difference of this magnitude, the
four-fifths ratio is achieved only if enough positions are available to
hire more than 50 percent of job candidates. A d value reported for
educational credential (bio data) screens is 0.33.159 To meet the four-
fifths criterion, 75 percent of job seekers must be hired. Finally, one
meta-study reports an average black-white difference on job sample
task simulations of 0.38 standard deviations.160 Satisfying the four-
fifths rule would require hiring more than 75 percent of majority job
candidates. These numbers indicate that compliance with disparate
impact targets is possible only for relatively unselective positions.
Yet employers make the heaviest use of personnel screening when
staffing is competitive—the very situation in which results are
likely to generate a prima facie case of disparate impact. And com-
petitive hiring is commonplace in our society today.
As summarized by a review article on disparate impact compli-
ance, “[c]learly, optimal use of valid selection tests that demonstrate
subgroup differences cannot occur without significant impact on the
realization of equal representation of different groups.”161 In other
words, employers who seek out the most productive workers will
157. See Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 116 (“[W]ith [job] selection ratios of
0.10, 0.50, and 0.90 and a subgroup standardized predictor difference of 1.00 [d=1 standard
deviation], the proportion of a lower scoring group hired [relative to applicants from that
group] would be 0.013, 0.159, and 0.61 respectively.”).
158. See Huffcutt & Roth, supra note 110, at 184. 
159. Bobko, Roth & Potosky, supra note 123, at 565.
160. See Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 119 tbl.4.1.
161. Id. at 116.
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routinely hire too few minorities. Of course, triggering a presump-
tive disparate impact violation is not equivalent to being held liable.
The defense of job-relatedness is still available to employers who
are convinced that their selection criteria are valid and important
to the conduct of their business. As discussed in greater detail
below, however, that possibility is cold comfort, because defending
a disparate impact lawsuit is a costly and risky endeavor.162 The
pervasive threat of disparate impact liability generates considerable
unfairness, imposes ongoing burdens, and encourages evasions and
distortions of the underlying goals of the doctrine. And these costs
yield few benefits for minority workers, whose underrepresentation
is ultimately traceable to factors that disparate impact was never
designed to address.
IV. REFORMING DISPARATE IMPACT: ALTER OR ABOLISH IT
The IOP literature indicates that disparate impact law, in its
current state, is flawed. Although legal scholars have noted the
uncertainties created by the doctrine’s ambiguities,163 its disappoint-
ing record as an instrument for vindicating employee rights,164 and
the onerous requirements it imposes on employers,165 they have paid
almost no attention to group differences in skill and the challenges
these pose for the nuts and bolts of personnel selection. A clear-eyed
look at these realities reveals that the empirical assumptions under-
lying Griggs and its progeny are unfounded. In light of these short-
comings, this Part proposes a significant reform of the doctrine as
applied, or, in the alternative, its wholesale repeal. 
The most important defect in the current disparate impact regime
is that it incorporates labor market assumptions that fail to square
with reality. As noted, the doctrine as currently structured operates
on the implicit premise that persons from varying racial and ethnic
162. See infra Part IV.
163. See supra note 74.
164. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 705-06 (2006) (discussing how disparate impact litigation has failed to deliver on
the promise of increasing minority representation in the workforce and may have hindered
efforts to curb discrimination). 
165. See supra notes 57-71.
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groups are similar in their skills, aptitude, or productivity.166 This
is not the case at present.167 The reality of racial gaps virtually
guarantees that employers seeking to maximize job productivity will
generate a workforce that falls short of the stringent requirements
of the four-fifths rule or that shows a statistically significant
imbalance in workforce composition by race. Because commonly
used personnel methods routinely produce adverse impacts, many
employers’ procedures will be vulnerable to challenge and to the
requirement of demonstrating business necessity or job-relatedness. 
This situation exposes many, if not most, employers to the threat
of a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit. And defending such a
lawsuit will necessarily be expensive, risky, and complex.168 The
need to establish the job-relatedness defense places businesses at
the mercy of ambiguous rules and unsettled standards.169 Formal
validation is costly and often practically impossible, and the extent
to which courts will demand such validation is unpredictable.170
Efforts to establish content validation frequently depend on expert
testimony, which is expensive and resource-intensive.171 The out-
come of any validation inquiry is uncertain. These vagaries en-
courage businesses to engage in inefficient, counterproductive, and
potentially illegal maneuvers designed to avoid disparate impact
challenges.
Reforming disparate impact to relax the criteria for presumptive
liability, or abolishing the doctrine altogether, will have the desir-
able effect of reducing wasteful litigation and lowering incentives to
engage in perverse self-protective measures. Neither reform will
undermine equal workplace opportunities nor decrease minority
access to desirable jobs. The IOP evidence indicates that social
forces beyond the reach of employment discrimination laws deter-
mine workplace demography. To put it bluntly, the paucity of minor-
ities, and especially blacks, in most job categories is overwhelmingly
due to their lower level of job-related skills compared to other
groups in the workforce. 
166. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
168. See supra note 70.
169. See supra notes 56-70.
170. See supra note 70.
171. See supra note 70.
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A. Alter It: Disparate Impact Realism
The discussion so far has focused on job selection and screening:
the methods that employers use to decide whom to hire or promote
into various positions. But the objective of such decisions is to select
the best workers—those who will ultimately perform the job well.
The proposal advanced here hones in on that goal and takes
advantage of what we know about worker productivity. The
suggestion is that disparate impact law should be revised to reflect
group disparities currently measured in actual worker performance.
The evidence points the way toward a disparate impact standard
that is more in line with current demographic facts, as well as with
the doctrine’s stated purpose.
As already discussed, the best data available estimates that
blacks and whites differ, on average, by roughly 0.3 standard devi-
ations in performance outcomes for most jobs, with a reported range
between about 0.24 and 0.39 standard deviations.172 That observa-
tion suggests, first, that screening practices currently in use are
generating a workforce in which the productivity of black workers
lags somewhat behind whites, but with smaller gaps than exist for
many valid personnel screening tests. It also indicates that busi-
nesses and employers have not succeeded in narrowing these
discrepancies. Although, as discussed more extensively below, the
reasons for this situation are speculative and complex, some impli-
cations emerge. 
First, in light of the evidence of real underlying differences in the
average productivity of blacks and whites, there is no reason to
believe that businesses are discriminating against, and thus dis-
proportionately excluding, more able minority workers. It is thus
unlikely that the status quo is the product of invidious discrimina-
tion or of businesses erecting arbitrary barriers to minority em-
ployment. 
Second, assuming that employers are trying to operate as a
competitive meritocracy geared towards maximizing productivity,
the data suggest that they are missing the mark. Current levels of
racial balance, whether in compliance with the disparate impact
172. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
2011] DISPARATE IMPACT REALISM 667
rule or not, are being achieved through the employment of minori-
ties who are, on average, somewhat less productive than whites.173
This situation is out of sync with the meritocratic ideal that lies at
the heart of the disparate impact rule.174 A perfectly functioning
meritocratic system should ideally show no racial gaps in job
performance. All persons, regardless of their group identity, should
be selected for jobs based on their actual productivity. But this is
not quite what is happening today.175
Third, the existence of gaps favoring the lower-performing group
indicates that a legal standard geared to an expectation of equal
representation by race—or its close proxy, the four-fifths rule—is too
stringent. Although legal expectations are probably not the only
factor behind this overshoot in minority hiring, they might well
contribute to it.176 And the status quo evidence shows that current
disparate impact doctrine is not alleviating its effects.177
These observations suggest that the disparate impact standard
should be dialed back. They also suggest a plausible strategy for this
retrenchment. The proposal here is to adopt a regime of “disparate
impact realism.” Under this reform, the dominant standard for
triggering disparate impact liability under Title VII would be
relaxed to reflect real, concurrent group differences in actual job
performance—as opposed to performance differences on job screens.
The expectation is that the rule would move the pattern of job
performance closer to parity by allowing employers to be somewhat
more selective in hiring or promoting minority workers. By gearing
staffing to observed patterns of on-the-job success, realism attempts
to erase racial work performance disparities through an appropriate
downward adjustment in expected minority-majority hiring ratios
in some cases. In effect, this would allow employers to screen out
more minority workers than under the current rule. Ideally, this
would cause race differences in job performance to narrow and
perhaps even converge. Whether this would happen—and, for
reasons explained below, it might not—the reform would still be
173. See supra note 104.
174. See supra note 41.
175. See supra note 103.
176. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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desirable because it would decrease employers’ vulnerability to
disparate impact lawsuits. 
How would realism work? The first step is to make the stylized
assumption that the productivity pattern of the background
population matches the pattern IOP experts observe for workers
themselves—as reflected specifically in observed average group
differences in performance such as the 0.3-0.4 standard deviation
disparity measured between black and white workers. This means
that, if employers were to hire randomly from the background
population (or appropriate pool of job candidates) regardless of race,
the workforce would display group (for example black-white)
differences in actual job performance that matched disparities
currently observed. The second step is to calculate the group hiring
ratios that would be expected under a valid and predictive meri-
tocratic selection system as a function of the designated productivity
gap and various levels of job selectivity. Here it is assumed, in
keeping with the understandings underlying the current disparate
impact rule, that employers are entitled to hire workers who will be
most, and equally, productive, regardless of race—a concept central
to the competitive meritocracy. Thus, the ultimate objective of the
rule is to produce a cohort of job-holders who will be matched for
work productivity, with no race performance gaps observed among
actual workers. Given current patterns of productivity, this will
necessarily involve relaxing the assumption of racially proportionate
hiring and promotion. Fewer blacks than whites will be selected
from the applicant pool, and fewer will occupy many, if not most,
jobs relative to their numbers in the population. In many cases,
these ratios may fall significantly short of the four-fifths standard. 
According to Figure 1A, discussed above, the expected hiring
ratios for different groups can be calculated as a function of two
parameters: group differences in performance on a presumptively
valid screening test; and the selectivity of the position in question.178
A critical insight, however, is that these relationships between
expected hiring ratios and job selectivity also hold when the param-
eter of group differences (d value) relates to actual, expected job
performance, rather than to scores on job screening tests, which are
178. See supra Figure 1A.
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merely predictive of performance.179 Assuming that the d value
represents the actual racial gap in expected job performance rather
than the gap in performance on a job screen, the appropriate ratio
of minority to majority hires for positions of varying selectivity,
corresponding to the slots available, can once again be determined
from the example graphically depicted in Figure 2.180
This example assumes that the goal is to select the most produc-
tive persons available from the entire pool of job candidates, re-
gardless of group identity. This entails selecting persons from each
group who will perform the job equally well and should produce a
workforce in which there are no detectable differences in produc-
tivity between workers from different groups. As previously noted,
Figure 2 reveals that, when two groups differ in the level and dis-
tribution of expected job performance, the hires from each group,
and the hiring ratios, can be determined from the pattern of two
overlapping curves. As d (the difference in average productivity
between groups) increases, the curves will move further apart,
which will result in fewer hires from the less productive group. The
number of candidates chosen from each group (above the vertical
cutoff) will in turn be a function of the positions available. As posit-
ions become scarcer, the cutoff line will move to the right, which
corresponds to an increase in the level of performance demanded
from persons selected. Figure 2 reveals that fewer persons from the
less productive group (A) are chosen relative to the more productive
group (B) as the performance cutoff increases.
The values corresponding to these numbers can be identified from
the charts depicted in Figures 1A and 1B, which contain identical
values. In contrast with the example discussed above,181 the value
of d can here be taken to represent actual job performance ratings,
or productivity, rather than scores on pre-selection screens. The
tabulation in Figure 1B reveals that, given a standardized group
difference in actual productivity of about one-third of a standard
deviation (which is roughly the black-white difference reported in
179. This application is anticipated by Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 934 (noting that
for a designated black-white difference in job performance, “we can determine the number of
White and Black applicants who would be hired under different scenarios ... if one were able
to select on the basis of actual job performance”).
180. See supra Figure 2.
181. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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the IOP literature),182 the ratio of minority to majority hires
expected, as adjusted for each group’s representation in the appli-
cable candidate pool, would range from approximately .4 to .99,
depending on the selectivity of the position in question. For
example, for a job in which 25 percent of the majority applicants
were hired, a black-white gap of 0.3 in expected productivity would
predict a ratio of hiring percentages between blacks and whites of
no more than .66. Although not negligible, this is significantly lower
than the .8 ratio that satisfies the four-fifths rule. Likewise, for a d
value of 0.4 (which is also within the range of on-the-job disparities
reported in the literature), where 25 percent of white applicants are
hired, the expected black-white ratio of persons hired, adjusted for
applicant population, would be .57, which is also well below .8. For
more competitive jobs, the requirements would be even less strin-
gent. For example, if the position allowed the hiring of only 10
percent of majority candidates, and assuming a d value between 0.3
and 0.4, the ratio of blacks to whites hired relative to the candidate
pool for each group would be between .46 and .57—that is, one
would expect that roughly half as many blacks as whites would
occupy a given position. Under disparate impact realism, any pro-
cess that achieved at least that result—that is, produced a ratio of
black to white hires of this magnitude or higher—would be immune
from disparate impact challenge. Figure 1B depicts this point. The
box defined by the broken line includes hiring ratios that would be
expected for two groups with an average difference in job productiv-
ity (d value) of 0.3 or less, which is a rough estimate, perhaps on the
low side, of the measured black-white difference. If that value were
selected as the standard, then any hiring ratios within the box
would be permissible under disparate impact realism and would not
trigger presumptive disparate impact liability.
182. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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Figure 1B:183 Minority Group Selection Ratios and Four-Fifths Ratios When the
Majority Group Selection Ratio Is 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 95%, or 99%
Standardized 
group 
difference (d)
Majority group selection ratio
1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%
0.0   .010  .050  .100  .250  .500  .750  .900  .950  .990
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.1  .008   .041  .084  .221  .460  .716  .881  .938  .987
 .80  .82  .84  .88  .92  .95  .98  .99  .99
0.2  .006  .033   .069  .192  .421  .681  .860  .925  .983
 .60  .66  .69  .77  .84  .91  .96  .97  .99
0.3  .004  .026  .057  .166  .382  .644  .837  .910  .978
 .40  .52  .57  .66  .76  .86  .93  .96  .99
0.4  .003  .021  .046  .142  .345  .606  .811  .893  .973
 .30  .42  .46  .57  .69  .81  .90  .94  .98
0.5  .002  .016  .038  .121  .309  .568  .782  .873  .966
 .20  .32  .38  .48  .62  .76  .87  .92  .98
0.6  .002  .013  .030  .102  .274  .528  .752  .851  .957
 .20  .26  .30  .41  .55  .70  .84  .90  .97
0.7  .001  .010  .024  .085  .242  .488  .719  .826  .947
 .10  .20  .24  .34  .48  .65  .80  .87  .96
0.8  .001  .007  .019  .071  .212  .448  .684  .800  .936
 .10  .14  .19  .28  .42  .60  .76  .84  .95
0.9  .001  .006  .015  .058  .184  .409  .648  .770  .922
 .10  .12  .15  .23  .37  .54  .72  .81  .93
1.0  .000  .004  .011  .047  .159  .371  .610  .739  .907
 .00  .08  .11  .19  .32  .49  .68  .78  .92
1.1  .000  .003  .009  .038  .136  .334  .571  .705  .889
 .00  .06  .09  .15  .27  .45  .63  .74  .90
1.2  .000  .002  .007  .031  .115  .298  .532  .670  .869
 .00  .04  .07  .12  .23  .40  .59  .71  .88
1.3  .000  .002  .005  .024  .097  .264  .492  .633  .846
 .00  .04  .05  .10  .19  .35  .55  .67  .85
1.4  .000  .001  .004  .019  .081  .233  .452  .595  .821
 .00  .02  .04  .08  .16  .31  .50  .63  .83
1.5  .000  .001  .003  .015  .067  .203  .413  .556  .794
 .00  .02  .03  .06  .13  .27  .46  .59  .80
183. See sources cited supra note 150. The table shows the minority selection ratio (number
hired/number applicants, non-bold number in each cell) and four-fifths ratio (minority
selection ratio/majority selection ratio, bold number in each cell) as a function of the majority
selection ratio (percent hired, from 1% to 99%, at top) and d (standardized group difference
in performance, at left). Tabled values in bold less than .80 represent scenarios that violate
the four-fifths rule.
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It is important to reiterate that the implicit assumption behind
disparate impact realism is that each group’s pattern of productivity
for the background job-eligible population corresponds to the
distribution, and group differences, in job performance actually
observed. This is a highly conservative assumption, because, as
explained below, job incumbents often have a narrower range of
abilities than the background population. Most jobs are somewhat
selective, so job incumbents are better matched for ability, and show
less racial disparity, than the population as a whole.184 There is,
however, no ready method, apart from random hiring and ex post
screening,185 to determine the performance profile of an unscreened
population for particular jobs. Thus, the assumption that the back-
ground population matches job incumbents on this measure is, at
best, a rough estimate that is highly favorable to underrepresented
groups, because it almost certainly understates racial group dif-
ferences in on-the-job performance that would be expected from
random hiring across the full range of potential job-seekers.
Despite these limitations, disparate impact realism possesses
several strengths. First, the approach abandons reliance on a fixed
target and replaces it with a sliding scale of staffing ratios that
better reflects the expected racial composition of the workforce
under competitive conditions. Although the sliding scale threshold
is somewhat more complicated than the four-fifths rule, it is not
significantly harder to apply. The appropriate ratio of hires from
each group can be determined as a function of data that IOP experts
have collected, and could continue to collect. These data are reported
in the standard literature, and could be made more readily available
in forms accessible to employers, prospective litigants, and judges.
An employer faced with a challenge to particular staffing practices
for specified positions could glean the expected hiring ratios from
compilations of data similar to the charts depicted in Figures 1A
and 1B. Using this information, employers could determine if they
were in compliance with applicable standards, and prospective
plaintiffs could too. As with current law, an employer whose hiring
patterns met the revised adverse impact targets would escape
184. See infra note 230 and accompanying text, including the discussion of “range
restriction.”
185. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
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liability altogether. If he were sued, the case could be expeditiously
resolved through summary judgment.
  The hope is that any additional complexity will be more than
compensated by the narrower scope of liability employers would
face. Indeed, the most compelling reason to adopt this reform is to
potentially reduce the number of workplace practices that are
vulnerable to disparate impact challenges and thus narrow employ-
ers’ exposure to potential liability. For cases that satisfy revised
criteria but would previously have fallen short of the four-fifths rule,
an employer’s task is simplified. He can invoke evidence of group job
performance disparities; he need not establish validity, which
requires showing a correlation between job performance and job
screens. 
To be sure, disparate impact realism does not give employers a
completely free hand. Hiring ratios that fall short of the revised
standards are still subject to challenge. Once again, the relevant
benchmark should be roughly a d value of between 0.3 and 0.4—the
average black-white on-the-job performance difference currently
reported in the literature. As already noted, if the relevant value of
d is set conservatively as 0.3 or below, the broken line in Figure 1B
indicates the minority-majority hiring ratios expected in order to
match groups for productivity. This means that any ratios within
the box defined by the broken line are permissible under disparate
impact realism. But Figure 1B also reveals that only situations
falling below the solid line and above the broken line (that is,
between those two lines) will produce expected hiring ratios that are
less than those now required by the four-fifths rule.186 Only in those
instances will employers have more leeway than at present. In cases
depicted on the rest of the chart, the standard will remain the
same.187 Moreover, even when hiring ratios expected under dispa-
rate impact realism (i.e., those within the broken line box) do fall
significantly below those mandated by the four-fifths rule, they may
still be substantial. For example, for a job in which a quarter of
white candidates are hired, the expected ratio of black to white hires
186. It is nonetheless worth observing that d values greater than about 0.5-0.6 are not
observed for most commonly used job screens. Therefore, the entire bottom portion of the
chart will simply be irrelevant to most personnel selection situations.
187. See supra Figure 1B.
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relative to applicants is .66. If those ratios are not achieved,
presumptive liability would apply, as with current law, and the
employer would have to defend its practices as job-related. In
addition, employers may still struggle to achieve target ratios,
because most valid job screens in current use—such as job inter-
views, educational credentials, or tests of skill proficiency—produce
group disparities that can exceed the average gaps in productivity
presently observed on the job. Thus, some hiring ratios generated
using commonplace screens may still fall short of the patterns
expected under disparate impact realism. 
These observations suggest that disparate impact realism is not
a radical change and that its effects are rather modest. Nonetheless,
the hope is that realism will broaden the safe harbor for at least
some segments of the labor market and relieve some employers of
the burden of demonstrating that their practices are job-related.
This is all to the good, because there is no evidence—and indeed,
given blacks’ lower average job performance, evidence to the
contrary—that minorities are being arbitrarily excluded from jobs.
Although the proposed revisions appear modest overall, the new
standard will make the most dramatic difference when staffing is
most selective. As Figures 1A and 1B indicate, the greater the num-
ber of candidates that apply for a position, the fewer the number of
minorities employers will be expected to hire.188 More specifically,
the ratio of blacks to whites selected will be smaller for the most
competitive positions, and black job-holders will be scarcer relative
to whites. For example, if only 5 percent of white candidates are
hired, the expected black-white hiring ratio is .52. For 1 percent, the
ratio is .4.189 These ratios represent a significant dialing back of the
four-fifths standard. Although the most selective jobs are often the
most prestigious and skilled, that is not always the case. Even low-
level jobs sometimes have many more applicants than slots. And
competition for police and firefighter positions—which do not
require an advanced education—is often fierce, with many seeking
the positions available. 
In sum, if one group lags behind another in performance on a job
screening criterion, the adverse impact on that group will increase
188. See supra Figures 1A, 1B.
189. See supra Figure 1B. 
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as the percentage of candidates hired declines.190 That is likewise
true if one group lags behind another in actual job performance.191
It follows that such patterns should not be actionable, let alone
result in liability. Under disparate impact realism, employers would
be immune from challenge for a greater number of outcomes that
are in line with expected workplace patterns.
 Another reason to adopt this approach is that disparate impact
now operates in the shadow of potential constitutional difficulties.
In Ricci v. DeStefano, the city of New Haven invalidated a promo-
tional test for firefighters after learning that too few blacks passed
the test.192 The city explained the action as an effort to avoid a
disparate impact lawsuit. White firefighters challenged the invali-
dation as racially motivated, claiming violations of Title VII and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantee.193 The
Supreme Court ruled that the city’s decision to throw out the test
constituted unlawful race-based disparate treatment because the
city lacked a “strong basis in evidence” to believe that the promo-
tional test would violate the disparate impact doctrine.194 
In suggesting, without deciding, that the Equal Protection ban on
intentional discrimination might limit the race-conscious steps
public or private employers could take to avoid violating the dis-
parate impact rule, the Ricci decision potentially casts doubt on the
legality of the disparate impact doctrine, at least in some circum-
stances, and adds to employers’ uncertainty.195 The specter of uncon-
stitutional action is a compelling reason to narrow the doctrine’s
ambit and reduce the number of situations vulnerable to disparate
impact challenge.
Third, compared to the current rule, disparate impact realism
better vindicates the core purposes of the doctrine, is more efficient,
and is fairer to employers. Current data on on-the-job performance
190. See supra Figures 1A, 1B.
191. See supra Figure 1B.
192. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal
protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and
on what terms—to make peace between them”); see also Richard Primus, The Future of
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343-44 (2010) (discussing the constitutional
implications of Ricci).
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show that employers are not arbitrarily screening out minorities
from jobs for which they are competitive.196 As discussed below,
there are several possible explanations for existing job productivity
gaps by race. One factor may be that employers are responding to
legal mandates and other societal pressures by overshooting the
mark. That is, they may be modifying or relaxing selection practices
to achieve greater racial balance.197 However, the disparate impact
rule does not require bending over backwards to achieve diversity,
and this outcome is actually at odds with its stated purpose of equal
opportunity.198 In fact, the situation that best comports with the
goals of disparate impact is a workforce that is equally productive
regardless of race. That is precisely what disparate impact realism
aims to achieve.
Fourth, given the demographic and workplace reality, virtually
every employer today operates under the threat of potential dis-
parate impact liability. This situation tempts employers to make
choices that are either undesirable in themselves or run contrary to
the objectives of the disparate impact rule. Disparate impact
realism potentially reduces the incentive to adopt perverse strate-
gies, at least in some cases.
Personnel practices that produce adverse impacts are pervasive.
Although the elements of a prima facie case are up for grabs, many
plaintiffs can easily meet the standard and employers are widely
vulnerable to suit. Virtually no aspect of the business necessity
doctrine is well-established, and uncertainties abound.199 Regardless
of the standard applied, establishing a defense of job-relatedness is
cumbersome, difficult, risky, and expensive.200 Although courts can
choose to impose strict or lenient requirements for demonstrating
business necessity, the potential for failure to meet the standard is
great. If the demand is for formal validation, an employer’s task
may be insurmountable. First, the proper method for demonstrating
predictive validity is far from straightforward, and establishing the
necessary correlations requires statistical sophistication and a high
196. See supra Part III.
197. See infra text accompanying note 284.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
199. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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degree of expertise, including an awareness of methodological
pitfalls and controversies.201 Second, to meet accepted standards,
employers must accumulate a large body of data. They must collect
and document the scores, ratings, or credentials of job candidates or
the appropriate pool of the work-eligible population. The perfor-
mance of workers who are actually hired must be measured using
reasonably reliable methods or methods that can withstand legal
challenge, and those ratings must be compared to screening
outcomes. In addition, correlations for majority and minority group
workers must be separately compiled and analyzed, with proper
corrections and adjustments for range restriction202 and other study
design limitations. Ideally, this analysis should be conducted
separately for distinct jobs. Even if feasible, this process is, at best,
protracted, expensive, and riddled with the potential for error.
Employers are often forced to engage experts to advise them on
their practices and to assist them in satisfying these data-intensive
legal requirements.203
In addition, outcomes are uncertain. The courts have left many
questions surrounding the business necessity defense unaddressed
or unresolved. They have provided little guidance as to when
different standards of job-relatedness are appropriate, and judicial
practice in this area is erratic and unpredictable.204 Indeed, the
spate of challenges to civil service exams for police and firefighters
—tests that are designed to reflect the specifics of the job and thus
are good candidates for content-validation—demonstrates that there
is no safe haven.205 Some courts have accepted content validation for
civil service exams, whereas others have demanded a more rigorous
showing.206 In any event, content validation, which often rests on
the testimony of experts, is also complicated and costly. As the
voluminous record in Ricci v. DeStefano reveals, satisfying a court
201. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
203. See supra text accompanying note 82.
204. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 75.
206. Compare Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (accepting the content
validity of the firefighters’ test at issue), with United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp.
2d 77, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting content validity and faulting the absence of formal
validation).
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that a job selection test is facially valid can be a protracted,
complex, and expensive undertaking that consumes considerable
private and judicial resources.207 In addition, the Civil Rights Act of
1991 has been interpreted to suggest that even a highly valid job
screen may fail to pass muster unless it can be shown that no other
equally valid method produces less disparate impact.208 This is a
very tough standard to meet, if only because it is difficult to
anticipate the alternative methods opponents might propose. In
sum, the ambiguities surrounding the meaning of the business
necessity defense, and the uncertainties as to which standards the
courts will apply, expose employers to significant burdens and risks.
For this reason, companies and businesses are loath to become
embroiled in disparate impact disputes. 
This reluctance creates a strong incentive for employers to engage
in evasive tactics. Employers seeking to avoid the risks of litigation
are forced to select from an unattractive menu of options, including
abandoning the most valid hiring and promotion practices, engaging
in covert affirmative action, or “race-norming” their selection cri-
teria. Some employers may choose to sacrifice validity for diversity,
either by relaxing job requirements or by reducing the stringency of
personnel selection across the board. Because this can result in a
decrement in worker quality and a less effective workforce, firms
would prefer to avoid this strategy. But the costs of litigation are so
high that employers may nevertheless choose this option. Alterna-
tively, firms can switch to more ad hoc or haphazard methods of
selection that can serve as a cover for the application of different
standards, criteria, or cut-offs across racial groups.209 Such race-
conscious practices, including affirmative action or “race-norming,”
are legally dubious under Title VII, contrary to the meritocratic
underpinnings of the disparate impact doctrine, and, for public
entities at least, arguably run afoul of the Equal Protection guar-
207. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 107 (“The heavier the burden of justifying
practices with adverse impact, the more likely an employer is to respond to the threat of
liability by eliminating the adverse impact, and the easiest way to do this is by engaging in
affirmative action.”); see also Issacharoff & Scharff, supra note 72, at 6 (“As disparate impact
law took hold ... [e]mployers turned increasingly to affirmative action to buttress the
representation of historically excluded groups.”). 
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antee.210 Further, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano, public employers have limited freedom to take
race-conscious steps to avoid liability for racial imbalances in their
workforces, and these restrictions may also extend to private
employers.211 Nonetheless, informal affirmative action or other race-
conscious action is hard to detect and prove. This means that
employers have some leeway to engage in various strategies to align
minority hires with disparate impact targets. By scaling back the
scope of unjustified potential liability, disparate impact realism will
lower employers’ incentives to engage in such potentially inefficient
or unauthorized ploys.212 
Perhaps the most important virtue of disparate impact realism is
that it functions as an information-forcing device by enhancing
210. Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1991 to outlaw so-called “race
norming” or racial adjustments in scores on job tests. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l), (m) (2006);
see also supra note 43.
211. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Primus, supra note 195.
212. It may be claimed that a proper application of the disparate impact rule will
ameliorate this entire dilemma. Defining and adjusting the pool of potential job candidates
to contain only “qualified” individuals will dramatically narrow the situations in which
adverse impact even occurs, thus reducing or obviating the need to prove business necessity.
If the baseline candidate pool is appropriately limited as a function of factors like geography,
local demographics, and standard job credentials—such as years of education and experience,
or specialized training and licensing in a particular field—the four-fifths target will prove
much easier to meet. The assumption is that expected group performance disparities can be
erased by controlling for common threshold job requirements, because, regardless of group
membership, applicants with similar educations and backgrounds should not differ
significantly in their ability to do a job. Thus, using such threshold requirements should
control for group disparities.
There are several problems with this line of reasoning. The main sticking point is that the
law is unclear on the composition of the relevant pool against which disparate impact is
assessed. The courts have set no clear standard for identifying the baseline population for
measuring adverse impact on minorities, and the lower courts vary in their approach. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text. In addition, the very threshold requirements that
supposedly level the playing field are themselves subject to challenge on disparate impact
grounds, as they often disproportionately screen out minorities. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. Finally, the data establishes that persons with similar years of education,
training, or experience are not necessarily equivalent in their degree of learning and skill. As
noted above, blacks and whites show average differences in academic achievement and
proficiency at every level of education. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. Given
this picture, applicants or job-eligible persons from different groups who are seemingly
“qualified” for a job—in that they satisfy some threshold requirements or meet basic
criteria—will not necessarily perform equally well. Thus, adjusting the baseline candidate
pool to account for such criteria will not necessarily erase group differences in job success. The
current situation illustrates this point. 
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employers’ incentives to investigate possible ways to reduce the
validity-diversity tradeoff. As discussed more fully below, the dispa-
rate impact rule is popular among those who insist that existing job
selection practices exclude too many minorities who could actually
succeed on the job.213 The contention is that refinements in per-
sonnel selection technology could reduce the validity-diversity
tradeoff.214 Although the search for such methods has so far proven
disappointing and there is good reason to believe it will ultimately
fail, some researchers continue to suggest that more intensive
efforts are needed and might bear fruit.215 To the extent that better
metrics might be found, however, they are best developed and
evaluated, at least in the first instance, by the very employers who
stand to benefit from them. Thus, rewarding businesses for search-
ing out and employing new methods that might better reconcile
diversity and validity is certainly desirable. But employers currently
have little incentive to try to devise or identify effective predictors
that reduce or minimize disparate impact. Under the stringent—
and highly unrealistic—standards for liability in force today, the
great majority of valid personnel practices can be expected to
generate enough racial disparity to trigger liability under a broad
range of real-world conditions.216 Thus employers will rarely avoid
a presumption of unlawful disparate impact despite their best
efforts at alleviating the validity-diversity tradeoff. Because there
is so little chance of finding substantially predictive screens that
also satisfy the four-fifths rule, employers currently have no reason
to search for and devise ways to meet the threshold requirements.
In contrast, under the somewhat lower expectations of disparate
impact realism, there may be more circumstances in which employ-
ers can identify criteria that, although still substantially predictive
of productivity, generate a workforce that is diverse enough to meet
target ratios. Because employers can thereby avoid being sued, or
summarily escape liability, they will have an incentive to search out
those methods. In sum, a more relaxed disparate impact standard
213. See infra Part IV.C.
214. See supra Part II.B.
215. See, e.g., Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 117 (suggesting that more
research is needed on measurement methods and approaches to “minimizing subgroup
differences”).
216. See supra Part II.
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potentially operates as an information-forcing device by rewarding
employers for devising practices that achieve greater diversity while
still maintaining efficiency. For this reason, realism is preferable to
the standard in force today.
Although realism has many virtues, it is also subject to chal-
lenges. The most serious issues relate to its reliance on job per-
formance ratings and on reported group disparities in worker
productivity as the linchpin for a more forgiving standard.217 This
feature generates a series of potential questions. Is the status quo
of existing racial job performance gaps an appropriate benchmark
for a revised disparate impact rule, and are the existing data on
these gaps trustworthy? Should the expected ratios of minority hires
be geared to differences currently observed among job incumbents
in the ability to do the job, or should they be tied to continuously
updated information? If not subject to frequent updates, does not
disparate impact realism run the risk of freezing current racial
inequalities in place, to the potential detriment of protected
minorities? If real-time data is the rule, how would disparate impact
realism play out in the face of a potentially dynamic situation? All
of these are important questions, and addressing them requires
subjecting the evidence of race gaps in job performance to a more
searching analysis. 
The proper application of disparate impact realism requires
trustworthy measures of job performance and accurate estimates of
group differences. A large market now exists for research by IOP
experts who support plaintiffs and businesses in discrimination
litigation and advise employers on how to design personnel policies
to best avoid liability.218 If disparate impact realism became the
standard, experts could put less effort into the complicated business
of validating job screens (by establishing their ability to predict
job success). Instead, they could focus their attention simply on
measuring on-the-job performance, including documenting group
differences for various occupations. In fact, although those parame-
ters are already part of the validation process, information on group
217. See supra text accompanying note 167.
218. See, e.g., Mary D. Baker, Hunter B. Hughes, Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock,
Proactive Responses to Second-Generation Risks in Labor and Employment Cases, 37 EMP.
REL. L.J. 28 (2011).
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disparities could be improved. Data on the validity of employment
selection methods is plentiful, but there is somewhat less evidence
on the adverse impact of personnel screens and on group differences
in actual productivity.219 The research studies are not as refined and
up-to-date as they could be.220 It would clearly be desirable to have
better and more extensive data on patterns of job performance for
specific types of work. The hope is that IOP experts would generate
more and better data on job performance, including information on
group differences, in response to the proposed disparate impact
reform. Although the need for high quality, reliable evidence
imposes an initial burden on employers, this would presumably
abate as large standard databases for particular types of jobs are
developed and become available. A sound empirical foundation for
claims of group differences in job performance could potentially
deter many lawsuits. This type of evidence should be deemed
probative at the initial stages of litigation, such as motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment.221 
One oft-heard claim is that assessments of job performance are
inherently unreliable because they are vulnerable to unconscious
biases and subjective distortions.222 A large literature has been
219. See Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos, supra note 96, at 120 (noting the relative paucity of
adverse impact data relative to evidence on validity and speculating that this is due to “a
concern regarding the legal implications of presenting data on subgroup differences”).
220. See, e.g., McKay & McDaniel, supra note 115, at 539 (noting the problem of relying on
older data when estimating job performance differences); see also Schmitt, Clause & Pulakos,
supra note 96, at 120 (noting methodological problems with data on group disparities in
performance on job screens and in the workplace). Methodological problems are commonplace
in this area, with published studies reporting a range of values for group differences in
performance that depend on methods of job assessment, the size and composition of the
workforce samples, the actual jobs examined, the selection screens employed, and statistical
techniques and corrections applied. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. There is
clearly room for improvement.
221. Before general ability testing went out of fashion in the wake of disparate impact
challenges, some courts would accept the large body of evidence documenting racial gaps on
general ability tests, as well as the correlation between general ability and job performance
across the board, in lieu of individualized validation studies assessing the employer
defendants’ specific procedures. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1215 n.160 (“A small but not
insignificant number of courts already accept the validity generalization hypothesis [with
respect to general ability tests]; defendants in such courts need not perform a local validation
study.”). That practice should be revived under disparate impact realism.
222. Subjective hiring and promotion processes have been challenged as vulnerable to race
and gender bias on theories of both disparate impact and disparate treatment. See, e.g., Wax,
supra note 121, at 981 (noting the contention that subjective job evaluations are vulnerable
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devoted to scrutinizing the accuracy, reliability, and reproducibility
of job performance assessments with particular attention to whether
subjective ratings are tainted by impermissible factors such as race.
Although some research claims to detect race effects in worker
evaluations, the expert consensus is that subjective supervisor
ratings are reliable and a fairly accurate reflection of work perfor-
mance overall.223 In particular, studies reveal a high concordance
between subjective appraisals and objective, quantifiable measures,
such as absenteeism, tardiness, work errors, tasks completed, and
work unit output.224 When detected, race effects are minimal. The
modest size and lack of consistency in observed race effects, and the
substantial correlations between objective and subjective measures
of performance for all racial groups, have produced a cautious
to distortion by inadvertent or unconscious anti-minority bias); see also John Monahan,
Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1715, 1733 n.51 (2008) (describing
challenges to subjective and discretionary personnel evaluations at Home Depot and
Walmart).
223. See, e.g., Outtz & Newman, supra note 97, at 76-78 (concluding that racial bias in
subjective job assessments is marginal and has little effect on rating accuracy). Even when
the data suggest that subjective assessments are influenced by the racial identity of
supervisors and workers, it has not been established whether this results from discrimination
against opposite-race workers or in favor of same-race workers, or whether black or white
supervisors (or both) are biased. That is because there is often no stable, independent
standard against which to measure the accuracy of subjective ratings. See, e.g., J. Kevin Ford,
Kurt Kraiger & Susan L. Schechtman, Study of Race Effects in Objective Indices and
Subjective Evaluations of Performance: A Meta-Analysis of Performance Criteria, 99 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 330, 334 (1986) (summarizing and discussing data on rater and ratee race effects); Kurt
Kraiger & J. Kevin Ford, A Meta-Analysis of Ratee Race Effects in Performance Ratings, 70
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 56, 58 (1985) (noting that the lack of a benchmark for actual performance
means that “a meta-analysis of race effects cannot separate the relative contributions of ratee
performance and rater bias to ratings differences”). 
224. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 63, at 1211 (noting concerns about bias in subjective
workers ratings, but discussing one important study in which subjective and objective
measures were aligned). As with other measures in the IOP field, the main challenges are
methodological. Job assessment protocols are diverse and the elements of performance that
employers value vary across contexts. IOP experts have been working to improve the quality
and reliability of job ratings. In general, they find that subjective assessments tend to be more
reliable when procedural checks and safeguards against inconsistencies and arbitrariness are
introduced. See, e.g., Baker, Hughes, Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 218, at 13 (noting that
supervisor ratings can be made more reliable and consistent when managers are held
accountable and forced to justify or explain judgments, when appraisal methods are highly
structured and include objective instruments or assessments, and when multiple and diverse
raters are employed). For a review of job performance assessment methods, see, for example,
McKay, supra note 97, at 251-52. 
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consensus among experts: most of the observed disparities in worker
ratings by race are due to real differences in performance and
cannot be attributed to supervisor bias.225 
In any event, the objection that disparate impact realism is
unworkable because job performance ratings are unreliable and
tainted by bias applies with equal force to the disparate impact rule
as currently applied. Central to its operation is the employer’s as-
sertion of the business necessity or job-related character of a
selection practice.226 But that defense rests on demonstrating a
correlation between a job selection method and occupational job
performance, which requires rating workers on the job. If such
measures are distorted, whether through bias or otherwise, then the
entire structure of disparate impact liability is fatally flawed. In
short, the concept of validation, which is a key feature of the dis-
parate impact rule,227 assumes that the criterion for validity—the
appraisal of job success—is accurate and sound. If it is not, rejecting
disparate impact realism does not eliminate the problem. 
Even if employee ratings are fairly reliable, the question remains
as to why existing racial job performance gaps are an appropriate
benchmark for a revised disparate impact rule. Why does it make
sense to gear the expected ratios of minority hires to observed group
differences in job success? As already noted, realism indulges the
assumption that group performance differences on the job reflect
differences in ability to do the job in the background pool of eligible
workers.228 Does that assumption make any sense? 
Addressing this question requires a more nuanced understanding
of racial differences in job performance in relation to the spectrum
of abilities among job candidates and the winnowing function of job
225. See Outtz & Newman, supra note 97, at 77 (“Altogether, it would appear that black-
white differences in job performance ratings are attributable, on average, to actual differences
in job performance rather than to rater bias.”); see also Baker, Hughes, Mitchell & Tetlock,
supra note 218, at 23 (“Experts who claim that subjective assessments are inherently biased
base their claim on lab studies from social psychology that do not replicate in the field, and
those experts ignore the field studies by [IOP] psychologists to the contrary.”); Ford, Kraiger
& Schechtman, supra note 223, at 335 (“[C]onsistent effects on all ... criterion types [for
performance assessments] suggest that there are race differences in job performance in the
organizations sampled.”). 
226. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part IV.A.
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selection devices. In light of employers’ interest in finding workers
with the best predicted future performance, employers will try to
match applicants to the requirements of the job and screen out
people who will perform less well. Accordingly, job screening pro-
tocols are designed to choose people with a similar ability to do a
job, regardless of their racial identity. Thus, effective staffing
practices should ideally minimize or eliminate background group
differences in the people hired for particular positions.229 
Because job incumbents, regardless of group identity, are often
chosen to possess similar levels of skill, they are characterized by
so-called range restriction—they are generally not representative of
the background population as a whole or even of the pool of
candidates for that job.230 Range restriction tends to be greatest for
jobs that turn away the most applicants and are the most competi-
tive.231 The most competitive jobs often, although not always, re-
quire higher levels of skill. Likewise, job screening may be minimal
for some lower level jobs. But even unskilled workers are not hired
entirely at random. Although the situation varies widely with
economic conditions and the position at issue, some degree of
selectivity (and thus range restriction), however informal, operates
at all levels of the job market. 
Range restriction helps explain why racial disparities in job
performance tend to be smaller than those measured for many
standard job selection criteria. For example, black-white differences
in mean scores on general mental ability tests are typically two to
three times larger than differences commonly observed in job per-
formance, and race gaps on other standard job selection criteria,
which tend to be narrower than for pure ability tests, can also
exceed black-white performance gaps seen on the job, although by
229. See supra text accompanying note 175.
230. See, e.g., John E. Hunter, Frank L. Schmidt & Michael K. Judiesch, Individual
Differences in Output Variability as a Function of Job Complexity, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 28,
29 (1990) (“The standard deviation for incumbent workers is subject to restriction in range
caused by selective hiring, selective promotion of better workers, and selective termination
of poorer workers.”). Range restriction is an important methodological problem in the IOP
field, affecting estimates of all parameters relevant to personnel management and their
correlations. See, e.g., Sackett, Borneman & Connelly, supra note 116, at 217 (“Failure to take
range restriction into account can dramatically distort research findings [on personnel
selection].”). 
231. See infra note 240.
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less.232 Second, as noted, IOP experts have observed that perfor-
mance ratings for jobs at every level depend in part on personal,
non-cognitive attributes that are not well-captured by conventional
selection methods.233 These attributes are de-emphasized in present
job selection relative to cognitive skills because they do not correlate
as strongly with performance and cannot be measured as precisely
or accurately.234 To the extent that commonly used personnel
screens fail fully to gauge the range of performance-related behav-
ior, scores on selection criteria will not perfectly predict job success. 
These observations help explain why racial job performance gaps
are smaller than on standard selection criteria. They also help
account for the fact that racial disparities in job ratings persist
despite some degree of screening. As noted, a perfectly functioning
meritocratic system using omnisciently predictive metrics should
produce no racial gaps in job performance at all. Regardless of the
distribution of skills in the background populations, job incumbents
should be equally capable of doing the job, and racial gaps among
job-holders should disappear.235
This is not the pattern observed. Although job holders tend to be
more similar than job candidates, or the general population, in
ability to perform a job, racial disparities in job success persist.236
Several factors probably contribute to this. First, existing personnel
devices are inherently imperfect, and thus fail to control fully for all
background differences or attributes that bear on performance.237
Skill disparities in the background population will thus tend to
232. The average difference in cognitive ability for blacks and whites hovers around one
standard deviation, whereas most measured differentials in job performance range between
about 0.24 and 0.39 standard deviations. See, e.g., Outtz & Newman, supra note 97, at 85
(“[S]ubgroup differences on cognitive ability tests are far larger than subgroup differences on
actual job performance.”); see also Murphy, supra note 123, at 138 (“The adverse impact of
cognitive tests is particularly egregious because test score differences are known to be
substantially larger than differences in job performance, academic achievement, and other
criteria typically used to evaluate the success of selection decisions.”). For comparisons of job
performance ratings with scores on selection tests, see McKay, supra note 97, at 249-70.
233. See discussion of “task performance” and “contextual performance,” supra note 123
and accompanying text. 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 136-48.
235. See supra text accompanying note 186.
236. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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carry over into the workplace.238 Second, employers operating in the
shadow of current antidiscrimination law may shy away from
screens that produce too much adverse impact. Unfortunately, these
tend to be the devices that best predict job success. This trend
reduces employers’ ability to match candidates to jobs and tends to
preserve background disparities in the population hired. As noted,
a commonly relied-on job credential is years of education or spe-
cialized training (“biodata”). However, hiring people with similar
years of schooling will not eliminate group disparities because years
of education are an imperfect proxy for actual skills, on which blacks
and Hispanics tend to be deficient.239 Thus, matching workers based
on years of schooling will not necessarily eliminate racial gaps in
proficiency on the job.240 In sum, although workers in particular jobs
should ideally be equally able regardless of race, they are not. Group
differences persist in measured job success. 
238. The target of performance parity is an ideal that, even in a race-blind system, will
likely never be perfectly achieved as long as skill differences persist between groups.
Employers typically hire people who are best qualified first but then proceed to fill slots from
the top down. Alternatively, they hire candidates who possess minimal qualifications but who
represent a spectrum of abilities above a designated threshold. Either method can produce
a range of actual productivity among those hired, because not everyone will perform exactly
the same. Given differences in the background population, the distribution of skills among
persons hired using even race-blind, top-down protocols will likely not match by race. For all
these reasons, the practical reality will deviate somewhat from the ideal.
239. See Robert E. Ployhart, The Diversity-Validity Dilemma: Strategies for Reducing
Racioethnic and Sex Subgroup Differences and Adverse Impact in Selection, 61 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 153, 167 (2008) (noting that years of education are not a good proxy for actual
ability when used without gauges of actual knowledge, skill, and achievement); see also Philip
L. Roth & Philip Bobko, College Grade Point Average as a Personnel Selection Device: Ethnic
Group Differences and Potential Adverse Impact, supra note 199, at 402 tbl.1 (noting 0.78
standard deviations difference between blacks and whites on college grade point average). See
generally ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 112.
240. The effects of job screening on worker performance and range restriction would appear
to predict that measured job performance differences by race should be relatively greater for
unselective jobs than for highly competitive positions. If almost all candidates for a particular
position are hired, then persons hired from each group will be more representative of, and
thus will more closely reflect, their background population. Because, as noted, g-loaded
criteria are the most predictive of job success, and the black-white difference on such
measures approaches one standard deviation, the race gap in performance should be greater
for workers who are not stringently screened for ability. See supra notes 101-02 and
accompanying text. Of course, whether this will be observed depends critically on the profile
of the job candidate pool. The literature does not appear to be focused on comparing race
performance gaps across jobs as a function of selectivity, and there is little useful data
analysis on this point.
688 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:621
How do these observations bear on disparate impact realism?
Realism ties hiring ratios to group differences in productivity that
are currently measured in the real world. The strength of this
standard is that it is geared to actual patterns that workplaces have
achieved through the various personnel methods and screening
devices in common use. The data suggest that minority job-holders
are, if anything, lagging behind the white majority in actual per-
formance on the job.241 This means that existing job selection
practices are rather less stringent in screening out minorities than
whites, given actual performance measures. The reasons given
above for this “overshoot” are speculative, and the relative contribu-
tion of the possible factors cannot be known for sure. The inherent
technical limitations in current personnel practices are probably
crucial, and the fact that employers must hire from a range of
abilities to fill jobs also likely plays a role. However, some mild
degree of affirmative action in staffing—whether in the service of
diversity goals or in the shadow of the law—cannot be ruled out. 
This discussion reveals that the answer to the question of
whether measured patterns of job performance precisely reflect
group profiles in performance ability in the background workforce
is almost certainly “no.” It also reveals why this does not really
matter. Realism is a quick and dirty method for moving the situ-
ation closer to the disparate impact ideal or, barring that, at least
narrowing the scope of potential liability. By allowing employers to
be more selective than under the four-fifths rule, realism is designed
to advance the objective of equal standards, and equal job perfor-
mance, regardless of race. Although employers’ target ratios are
predicted on the basis of actual job performance gaps, the realism
rule is not designed to preserve them. Rather, it is designed to close
them. The hiring ratios expected, as illustrated in Figures 1A and
1B, are calculated to allow employers to winnow out minority job
candidates to the degree necessary to generate a cadre of similarly
capable individuals from all groups (just as, ceteris paribus, the
hiring ratios expected given scores on job screens are designed for
the same purpose).242 Thus, the smaller minority-majority ratios
permitted by disparate impact realism would ideally bring the
241. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Figures 1A, 1B.
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measured job performance ratings of blacks and whites closer
together than they currently are. In any event, the ultimate goal is
to create a workforce in which people from different groups perform
the same, and there are no measurable differences in productivity
by race.
There is a problem lurking here: the very fact that disparate
impact realism is supposed to narrow racial differences in job
success generates a serious problem for the implementation of the
rule. If realism does shrink or eliminate observed performance gaps,
that will potentially alter the magnitude of the very benchmark
(racial differences in job performance) that determines whether an
employer violates the rule in the first place. More importantly, it
will do so in a perverse direction: as the black-white productivity
gap is seen to become smaller, the rule will require employers to
increase the ratio of blacks to whites hired. But that makes no sense
under the terms of the rule itself, which is based on the existence of
group skill differences in the background population—a situation
that disparate impact realism, and the original disparate impact
rule itself, has no power to address or alleviate. 
The problem is that, once disparate impact realism is imple-
mented, an observed racial convergence in measured job perfor-
mance could have two possible causes: it could result from employ-
ers becoming more selective, as the realism rule itself allows, or it
might be the product of underlying improvements in minority skill
levels. Employers should not be required to change their standards
in response to a convergence that results from a change in employ-
ment selection practices under disparate impact reform. After all,
a relaxation of the disparate impact rule does not in itself alter the
distribution of human capital among potential job candidates. On
the other hand, if blacks improve their skills relative to whites over
time, it is fair to expect employers to hire more of them. These
possibilities create the dilemma of distinguishing changes that
result from the operation of disparate impact realism from those
that are independent of the rule. The latter would justify increasing
pressure on employers to achieve more racial balance, but the
former would not. 
This is likely a non-problem, however. That a narrowing of group
differences in actual job performance is one of realism’s potential
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effects does not mean it will actually occur. As noted, there is good
reason to believe that many employers are currently routinely
violating the four-fifths rule despite the danger of incurring
liability.243 Indeed, given the size of racial skill gaps and the adverse
impact of many routinely employed job filters, many workplaces can
be expected to fall short of the diversity required even by the
relaxed standards of disparate impact realism. And informal ob-
servation suggests that racial imbalances are commonplace across
a spectrum of jobs. If workplace diversity does not currently differ
significantly from what disparate impact realism would allow,
reforming the law would not have much measurable effect on
minority representation in the workforce or patterns of job perfor-
mance. That is no argument against it, however. The hope is that
disparate impact realism will reduce employers’ potential legal
exposure, which, as already argued, is desirable in itself.
Beyond that, the situation may depend on how realism is imple-
mented. One key question is whether employers will be required to
present real-time data on productivity. If continuous updating of
evidence is required, then any narrowing of incumbent performance
from the operation of disparate impact realism would tend to
increase the expected hiring ratios under the rule, exemplifying the
perverse spiral already described. If employers can present baseline
data from the time of the rule’s implementation, however, then this
problem will go away. The main drawback of the latter protocol is
that it runs the risk of making realism insensitive to any actual
upgrades in minority human capital that might occur. This could
freeze in place an unequal status quo to the detriment of protected
groups. 
Although it is obviously desirable to monitor job performance
patterns over time, it should not follow that employers need to offer
updated data. Rather, evidence on racial discrepancies prior to and
around the time of implementation, suitably reinforced by addi-
tional evidence from this time frame, should suffice. Race gaps in
skill have been fairly stable in recent decades.244 Although those
differences might significantly narrow in the future with improve-
ments in education, experience, or training, this has yet to occur.
243. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
2011] DISPARATE IMPACT REALISM 691
Such developments, or other evidence pointing to significant society-
wide shifts in the distribution of human capital, would force a
reevaluation of the rule and the benchmark ratios used in applying
it. Short of that, however, currently observed productivity profiles
should serve as a rough and ready guide to expected staffing pat-
terns for the foreseeable future. 
That disparate impact realism may end up preserving the status
quo by permitting employers to do pretty much what they are now
doing is not a reason to oppose reform. It is important to emphasize
that employers currently are not screening out minorities who could
do the job as well or better than whites. They are not discriminating
by selectively or disproportionately excluding able minorities.
Rather, the evidence suggests just the opposite.245 To the extent em-
ployers continue with current practices under a relaxed rule,
minorities will not suffer harm.
In short, allowing employers to target lower ratios may advance
the goals of the disparate impact doctrine—which is to achieve a
competitive meritocracy. Even if realism does not close racial gaps
in work performance completely, employers will still be better off.
The data shows that employers are tolerating existing group
245. It could be objected that the observed pattern of somewhat lower average productivity
for blacks relative to whites does not rule out the possibility that employers are imposing
arbitrary hurdles contrary to disparate impact’s requirements. For example, an employer
could adopt a selection method that disproportionately (and selectively) screened out more
capable blacks in favor of the less capable. This scenario is farfetched in light of what is
known about commonly used job screens, which is that they are generally “unbiased”—that
is, they predict performance equally well for all groups, with more capable candidates tending
to score higher than persons who perform worse on the job. See supra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text. Thus, although these devices are not perfectly predictive, there is no
indication that they differentially screen out more capable individuals from some groups
relative to others and thus no evidence that employers are differentially rejecting more
capable blacks. Moreover, even if a manager was attempting to produce a “whiter” workforce,
it would make more sense to reject black applicants generally, rather than differentially to
exclude the most able ones. It is possible to imagine that a racist employer might want to keep
blacks from attaining success, but rejecting the most capable job candidates is a peculiarly
self-defeating way to accomplish this. The more likely strategy is just to exclude blacks from
a specific job category altogether. It is worth noting, finally, that the fact that blacks and
whites in a given position are observed to have roughly equal productivity does not rule out
that an employer is using selection devices with disparate impact. The employer could still
be hiring too few blacks relative to qualified persons available. However, that is an unlikely
scenario under current conditions, in which the percentage of qualified blacks is lower than
whites for many, if not most, occupations.
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disparities on the job.246 They are in fact living with them. And even
if workplace demographics do not change much, employers may still
benefit from a somewhat narrower scope of potential liability under
the realism rule. 
At the end of the day, disparate impact realism is rooted in
practical compromise. It responds to the concerns that motivated
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the doctrine in the first place
—which is that employers might exclude minorities for reasons
unrelated to job performance—while recognizing that prevailing
practices do not in fact pose this danger. It honors the competitive
meritocracy while recognizing the underlying reality—which is that,
under present conditions, a properly functioning system will gen-
erate significant racial disparities in many job categories. And it
holds employers to diversity requirements that are, if anything,
overly generous to minority job-seekers in light of the background
distribution of skill between groups and the relative shortage of
qualified minority workers.247 
246. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
247. Another limitation of the disparate realism reform proposed here is that it is mainly
directed at cases involving employment and especially those in which liability is based on a
racially adverse impact. The disparate impact rule has a broader reach, encompassing claims
of discrimination by gender in employment or in other areas such as housing, consumer credit,
and mortgage lending. See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary
Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375,
416-17 (2010) (describing lawsuits alleging unlawful disparate impact in mortgage lending
practices); Sara Aronchick Solow, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-Housing
Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 488 (2010) (noting that the federal Fair Housing law
“outlaws disparate impact in housing just as Title VII does in employment”); see also Ayres,
supra note 55, at 32-44 (describing lawsuits under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
against car dealers, car loan underwriters, and mortgage lenders for practices that have an
adverse impact on minorities); id. at 26-27 n.47 (quoting a commentary on ECOA regulation
stating that “[t]he act and regulation may prohibit a creditor practice that is discriminatory
in effect because it has a disproportionately negative impact on a prohibited basis” (citing
Official Staff Interpretations, Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity), 12 C.F.R. pt 202,
Supp. I, § 202.6(a)-2 (2009))). 
As for claims involving gender, these tend to target requirements for physical strength,
appearance, or fitness, on which the genders do differ significantly. Disparities in cognitively
related abilities between men and women tend to be small or nonexistent, although there are
exceptions (for example in fields like math or engineering and especially for jobs requiring
very high ability). Thus, adjustment of the four-fifths rule would generally not be indicated.
See Selmi, supra note 164, at 746 (discussing lawsuits claiming disparate impact by gender,
including class actions against Walmart and Home Depot). On disparate impacts generally,
see Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 112 n.147 (noting contexts in which the courts
have “declined to intervene to ameliorate racial disparities” generated by facially neutral
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B. Abolish It
Disparate impact realism does not change much. Although it
relaxes previous requirements in some circumstances, it preserves
them in many. Significant restrictions still apply, and presumptive
liability will be triggered in many cases. In addition, as described
above, realism potentially, and ideally, sets in motion a convergence
in patterns of observed work performance that contains the seeds of
its own destruction. This argues for viewing realism as a temporary
adjustment—a stopgap substitute for the present rule and a way
station towards a new equilibrium. 
That disparate impact realism is a modest proposal may serve as
a mark in its favor but also opens it to the criticism that it does not
go nearly far enough. As noted, one hope is that realism will give
employers greater leeway to search for qualified workers without
fear of being sued. Another is that it will at least protect businesses
from potential liability for some existing practices. Alternatively,
realism may have little or no effect on employers’ vulnerability to
disparate impact challenge. Many prevalent job screens—such as
educational credentials and structured interviews—show black-
white differences greater than 0.3 standard deviations, which place
them outside the “realism box” as depicted in Figure 1B248 and thus
beyond the reach of the modest safe harbor the proposal creates. If
most employers are currently using screens that exceed the adverse
impacts permitted even under realism’s more forgiving standards,
the reform will not only fail to alter actual hiring practices but will
also not shield more employers from lawsuits. Whether realism will
shrink the actual scope of potential liability relative to the current
rule is ultimately an empirical question. 
In sum, it is possible that the realism proposal detailed above will
make no practical difference. This observation suggests that a
better, albeit a more radical, approach would be to abolish the dis-
parate impact doctrine altogether, at least as applied to race in
employment.249 This would be equivalent to overruling Griggs v.
laws). 
248. See supra Figure 1B.
249. See supra note 247 (noting that disparate impact challenges can also be made against
employment practices with differential effects by gender and against practices in other
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Duke Power Co. and amending Title VII to remove racially disparate
impact as a basis for employment discrimination liability. 
The same points in favor of relaxing disparate impact’s require-
ments also strongly support the doctrine’s repeal. If the doctrine is
applied correctly, workplace diversity will not increase. If the
doctrine is applied incorrectly, which will happen with regularity,
the effects will be perverse and counterproductive. As already noted,
a shortage of qualified minority workers, not the widespread use of
non-merit based selection, is the principal culprit behind the lack of
workplace diversity. As long as the present demographic situation
persists, adverse impacts are to be expected. Moreover, the vast
majority of commonly employed selection criteria are valid and job-
related and produce the greatest diversity consistent with workplace
efficiency. Because the prevailing status quo generally comports
with disparate impact’s requirements, litigation should not lead to
greater racial balance and retaining the disparate impact rule will
advance no equal opportunity goals. Thus, even if employers are
able successfully to defend their personnel practices and manage to
resist changing them, disparate impact enforcement is wasteful and
pointless and imposes unnecessary burdens.  
Disparate impact lawsuits also carry too great a risk of unjusti-
fied liability. Because most sound, useful, and predictive personnel
practices show enough adverse impact to violate the four-fifths rule,
the standard for triggering a prima facie case is fatally overbroad
and ensnares far too much conduct in its net. This means that most
employers, if sued, will face the burden of justifying their staffing
practices. Given the legal uncertainties and practical difficulties
surrounding this task, employers run a significant risk of being
found liable regardless of whether their methods are valid or
whether they are actually violating the rule. To be sure, relatively
few disparate impact cases are filed compared to those that could be,
and employers usually prevail.250 But employers who are sued still
contexts).
250. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 164, at 739-40; Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race
Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 899 (2006) (noting that disparate
impact employment actions are relatively uncommon and that impact claims are almost
always coupled with disparate treatment allegations); see also Sherwyn & Heise, supra note
35, at 906 (“[T]he vast majority of discrimination cases are disparate treatment or intentional
discrimination cases.”). 
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face the prospect of protracted, expensive, uncertain, and resource-
intensive litigation. This encourages them to engage in perverse,
inefficient, and evasive tactics, including adopting convoluted and
less reliable job selection criteria or using race-conscious selection
techniques.
There are other good arguments in favor of repealing the
disparate impact doctrine. First, most claims brought under Title
VII allege unlawful disparate treatment.251 Abolishing disparate
impact would therefore have little overall effect on the vindication
of worker rights under Title VII. To be sure, disparate impact re-
mains an important avenue for challenging hiring and promotions
into sought-after government positions, most notably as police and
firefighters.252 But the evidence suggests that the costs imposed by
these cases are not worth the alleged benefits. These lawsuits place
an enormous burden on local governments and consume consider-
able time, attention, and resources that could be devoted to other
purposes. Although these legal challenges may marginally increase
diversity in select instances, the objective could be accomplished
more simply by other means, including abolishing civil service
exams entirely, or selecting randomly from minimally eligible pools
of applicants. In any event, diversity for its own sake is not what
disparate impact commands. The evidence in fact suggests that
qualified black candidates are not being arbitrarily screened out or
disproportionately denied jobs as police or firefighters. Although
research on performance patterns of police and firefighters by race
is relatively sparse, the existing data indicate that civil service
exams are good predictors of success in these types of jobs.253 The
familiar validity-diversity tradeoff applies as much to firefighter and
251. See Parker, supra note 250, at 898-99. 
252. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); MacDonald, supra note 75
(describing litigation initiated by the Justice Department challenging the civil service exam
for New York City firefighters and the district court ruling finding that the city’s test had an
unlawful disparate impact on black job candidates); see also Norton, supra note 75, at 254,
nn.233-34 (detailing cases presenting challenges to civil service exams). 
253. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. AAMODT, RESEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT SELECTION 34 (2004)
(noting that cognitive ability, and to a lesser extent civil service exams, predict evaluations
of police performance); Gerald V. Barrett, Michael D. Polomsky & Michael A. McDaniel,
Selection Tests for Firefighters: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 13 J. BUS. &
PSYCHOL. 507, 507 (1999) (finding that commonly used civil service tests predict training
expertise and supervisor ratings of firefighters).
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police positions, and civil service jobs generally, as to other occupa-
tions in the economy.254 Given racial gaps in developed skills and
abilities, racial imbalances in these jobs will likely persist within
any kind of selective meritocratic system. 
Yet another compelling argument for abolishing disparate impact
liability is that, although the potential for liability is widespread,
enforcement is selective, arbitrary, and erratic. Adverse impact is
everywhere, and the world is full of disparate impact lawsuits
waiting to happen. Racial imbalance is pervasive in business, the
professions, technological fields, academia, and finance.255 This
pattern is not confined to elite and lucrative positions. The U.S.
government has long used tests of cognitive ability, or tests that
draw heavily on such ability, to determine admission to the military
and assignments within it. The military’s entrance exams have a
pronounced disparate impact by race.256 Yet such practices persist
without serious challenge. It may be argued that plaintiffs do not
254. Of course, disparate impact plaintiffs challenge or simply ignore this evidence. See
MacDonald, supra note 75 (reporting on U.S. federal district court Judge Garaufis’s grant of
summary judgment for plaintiffs and his dismissal of evidence of racial differences in human
capital as an explanation for the adverse impact of a firefighters’ qualifying exam given by
New York City). Plaintiffs in these cases routinely contend that alternative selection methods
are available that can preserve or boost productivity with less disparate impact, and courts
sometimes buy this argument. As already discussed, there is no reason to believe such options
are currently available—for civil service positions or any other job—and good reasons to
believe they are not. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
255. Under Wards Cove Packing v. San Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and section 105 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs must ordinarily specify the practice or procedure that is the
source of the observed disparate impact. However, the credentialing and training
requirements for every white collar and professional job—such as nurse, lawyer, law clerk,
accountant, physician, pilot, engineer, computer programmer, college professor, teacher, or
administrator—produce disparate impacts at every stage and stand as important hurdles to
the entry of minorities into remunerative positions. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Application
of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982). This author is unaware of any
cases featuring disparate impact challenges to professional credentialing requirements.
256. According to a recent report, whereas 16 percent of otherwise qualified whites
applying for admission to the military (i.e., men and women with a high school degree and no
serious criminal record) scored below the minimum required on the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test (AFQT), 39 percent of African American applicants scored below the cutoff. CHRISTINA
THEOKAS, THE EDUC. TRUST, SHUT OUT OF THE MILITARY: TODAY’S HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION
DOESN’T MEAN YOU’RE READY FOR TODAY’S ARMY 3 (2010), http://www.edtrust.org/sites/
edtrust.org/files/publications/files/ASVAB_4.pdf. Among those achieving the minimum
threshold score for admission to the military, over 43 percent of white test takers, but fewer
than 18 percent of African American test takers, scored high enough (in the top two cate-
gories) to qualify for special technical training and placement in elite service jobs. Id. at 5.
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bother to sue because they believe judges will defer to the military
or to professional standards. Although that may be true, this
situation is arguably unfair to private employers of nonprofessional
staff who end up being sued for similar practices and must bear the
burden of litigation regardless of whether they ultimately prevail. 
A more critical question is whether, in the absence of disparate
impact liability, employers would impose hurdles or revert to
selection criteria that arbitrarily exclude minorities—the very fear
that underwrites the doctrine in the first place. The argument that
firms operating in a competitive environment have no interest in
screening out good workers from any group is unlikely to convince
proponents of strong antidiscrimination laws, who are generally
suspicious of market forces. In fact, the simple answer is that there
is no airtight guarantee against employers adopting overly ex-
clusionary practices, whether intentionally or not. Rather, the case
for repeal rests on a clear-eyed assessment of the main forces
underlying racial imbalances in the workplace today. 
The underrepresentation of minorities in large segments of the
job market is overwhelmingly the result of real skill disparities
rather than employer indifference to unjustified racial impacts.
Indeed, measured patterns are far more consistent with de facto af-
firmative action than with unlawful adverse impact. And even if
employers moved to significantly less diversity in the wake of
disparate impact repeal, that would still be consistent with merit-
ocratic ideals. Indeed, the repeal of the disparate impact rule would
allow employers to adopt more g-loaded—and predictive—screens,
which could well generate a greater racially adverse impact than
current practices. Strictly speaking, this would comport with cur-
rent doctrine: the courts have never barred employers from adopting
the strongest and most valid predictors of job success, regardless of
adverse impact, and using such predictors would presumably be
consistent with the job-relatedness requirement. If the disparate
impact doctrine were repealed, however, employers would not have
to demonstrate the validity of their screens or worry that their job-
relatedness defense would be rejected. They would not have to
defend their practices at all. This would significantly lighten their
burden and be more efficient in the long run.
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In sum, existing differentials are more than accounted for by
supply-side differences in job preparation or other cognitive or
noncognitive group-based factors. Despite the weaknesses of prev-
alent job selection devices, the holy grail of more accurate selection
with less adverse impact is unobtainable. At present, there is no
escape from the validity-diversity tradeoff. This is not just a matter
of limitations in the technology of personnel selection, although
those limitations exist. It is grounded in the realities of the current
distribution of human capital. 
Workforce imbalances are likely to persist without significant
changes in the distribution of skill. But it is important to remember
that inequalities in job qualifications are not of employers’ making,
and that employers are ill-equipped to correct them. Likewise,
supply side disparities are no concern of disparate impact law,
and the doctrine is not designed to address them. As noted by a
recent commentator, “[T]he theory of disparate impact ... comes too
late in an individual’s career to compensate for a variety of inequali-
ties earlier in life—in upbringing, education, or health care....
[Employers] do not have to redress the cumulative disadvantages
that individuals face from discrimination elsewhere in society.”257 
Those who view a racially balanced workforce as desirable in
itself may feel little compunction about forcing employers to
“redress the cumulative disadvantages” that minorities suffer.258 On
this view, a disparate impact rule that forces firms to employ a more
racially balanced workforce is all to the good, regardless of the
niceties of the law’s actual requirements. The problem with this
approach is that the desired result can only be achieved by ignoring
or misapplying the disparate impact rule itself. Racial balance
depends on encouraging businesses to engage in self-protective
affirmative action or in inducing them to relax their standards
across the board. But it is perverse to use disparate impact to
accomplish a result that is at odds with the doctrine’s stated
purpose, which is to enforce a race-blind meritocracy. Disparate
impact was not meant to accomplish by subterfuge and indirection
what the doctrine itself rejects. Moreover, imposing affirmative
action through the threat of disparate impact liability represents a
257. Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 110.
258. Id.
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judicial usurpation of the lawmaking function. By achieving a result
at odds with stated statutory principles, courts effectively circum-
vent ordinary political channels. If racial balance and greater
diversity are good policy, those priorities should be enacted directly
and defended on their merits, with a clear articulation of expecta-
tions and requirements. 
There is currently no general legal or constitutional requirement
that employers operate as a meritocracy. Managers need not hire
and promote on the basis of workers’ ability to do the job, so long as
they do not rely on forbidden factors.259 It is a paradox of disparate
impact that employers are restricted to some form of meritocratic
selection—that is, selection on criteria shown to be job-related—only
if the workplace shows a racial imbalance. Although meritocratic
staffing is fundamentally at odds with using race to achieve
demographic diversity, antidiscrimination law does not close off all
channels for achieving more racial balance than meritocratic
selection would allow. For example, as discussed more below, the
solution for civil service jobs may lie in discarding competency or
performance-based screens altogether, and adopting other neutral
and non-meritocratic approaches—such as lotteries or random
selection procedures—that ensure maximal workforce diversity
without perverting the law.260
One frequently voiced argument in favor of retaining the dis-
parate impact doctrine is that disparate impact liability is needed
to “smok[e] out” forms of subtle race- or sex-based discrimination
that might be “cloaked in race-neutral selection processes.”261 In
other words, disparate impact challenges provide “a way of finding
the stealth disparate treatment case” in which workers suffer
discrimination because of a protected characteristic.262 One problem
259. See, e.g., Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 35, at 910 (noting the Supreme Court’s holding
in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), that there is “no
obligation to hire the best candidate for a job. Instead, the employer simply could not
discriminate”).
260. See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
261. Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 41, at 114.
262. Id.; see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting the “smoking out” rationale); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 498-99 (2003); Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 35,
at 906 (“Disparate treatment cases are particularly difficult to assess because fact finders
must ascribe motivation to the actions of the employer.... [M]ost employers are now
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with this rationale, as noted, is that the amount of racial imbalance
that triggers a prima facie case of disparate impact also provides
little support for unlawful disparate treatment. As already argued,
racial disparities alone are at present exceedingly weak evidence for
forbidden conduct under either theory because supply side factors
can be expected to generate pronounced disparities even in the
absence of unlawful discrimination.263 
Nonetheless, the “smoking out” argument embodies the percep-
tion that the disparate impact framework is a more effective tool
than disparate treatment for targeting some forms of discriminatory
conduct. For example, a private employer might intentionally adopt
a neutral policy for the purpose of excluding blacks. Or a neutral
policy—such as subjective worker assessments—might permit un-
conscious race-based biases to contaminate outcomes, either by
skewing evaluations or by altering the weight given to evaluative
factors.264 
The disparate impact rule is not needed to get at these scenarios,
as they are—or should be—actionable as forbidden disparate
treatment. A neutral policy adopted for the purpose of excluding
minorities would clearly fall within the ambit of forbidden disparate
treatment under Title VII, because the policy was adopted “because
of race.”265 And the contention that a disparate impact rule is
necessary because the disparate treatment doctrine covers only
sophisticated enough to avoid creating the proverbial smoking gun that would easily establish
unlawful intent.”). 
263. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 121, at 1022.
264. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988, 990-91 (1988) (discussing
hiring decisions made using subjective criteria); Carle, supra note 43, at 258 (noting that
“[s]upporters of disparate impact analysis also advance arguments based on the difficulty of
proving hidden prejudice” and “the problems of subtle and subconscious bias”); Patrick S.
Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 75-83 (2010) (hypothesizing that an
employer might inadvertently rate “work experience” as more important when white
candidates possess comparatively more work experience than blacks); Elaine W. Shoben,
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What
Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 607-13 (2004) (asserting that a disparate impact theory might
succeed in imposing liability in meritorious cases where disparate treatment allegations
would fail).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (providing that it is unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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“intentional”—that is, conscious or deliberate—discrimination is not
supported by the statute’s language, which forbids adverse treat-
ment “because of race.”266 This language is not restricted to dis-
crimination based on “intentional” or conscious motives, because
race can sway a person’s decisions without that person’s awareness.
Although the courts are somewhat confused on the question of
whether Title VII covers unconscious as well as conscious disparate
treatment, the statutory language fits best with the broader
interpretation.267 Thus, the disparate impact rule is not necessary
to ensure that inadvertently biased conduct is actionable under Title
VII. Although unconscious disparate treatment may be difficult to
prove, that problem exists regardless of the theory of discrimination
advanced, and the burdens and complications of prosecuting a
disparate impact claim detract from any advantages of using that
rule. In sum, virtually all racially disparate treatment can be
tackled by alleging disparate treatment. Little or nothing would be
lost by abandoning a disparate impact analysis.
One remaining concern is the fate of allegations of discrimination
directed against state actors under the Equal Protection Clause. It
is often stated that this clause only protects against discrimination
or bias that is “intentional.”268 But that limitation is properly
understood to differentiate between governmental disparate treat-
ment based on race—which is forbidden by the Constitution—and
the government’s adoption of neutral policies with a racially
disparate impact—which is not considered actionable under the
Equal Protection Clause. However, the Supreme Court has never
ruled that adverse treatment by government actors that is inad-
vertently or unconsciously, and in that sense “unintentionally,”
motivated by race is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
Adverse decisions taken “because of” race, whether inadvertent or
266. See Shin, supra note 264, at 80-82 (noting that Title VII’s “statutory language does not
expressly say that an action must involve conscious consideration of a factor before it can
constitute discrimination because of that factor” and that “[t]he semantics of the ‘because
of ’ construction seem similarly open to the possibility of liability for unconscious discrim-
ination”); Wax, supra note 121, at 982-83.
267. See Shin, supra note 264, at 80-82; see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident,
74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1137-39 (1999).
268. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); see also Wax, supra note
267, at 1138 n.20.
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deliberate, should be regarded as violating the Equal Protection
guarantee. Likewise, neutral policies taken “because of” their
racially adverse effects should also be regarded as running afoul of
constitutional protections. Once again, a disparate impact analysis
should not be needed to get at situations in which unconscious racial
biases play a causal role in real-world outcomes. 
C. The Problem of False Negatives
Perhaps the most serious argument for retaining a strict dispa-
rate impact rule, or even going beyond it to adopt a race-conscious,
pro-diversity regime, is based on a critique of many competitive job
selection methods as fundamentally unfair to poorly performing
groups—and especially to blacks. Because strict enforcement of
disparate impact doctrine will presumably discourage competitive
practices that screen out minorities, preserving the status quo will
minimize this unfairness.
Although initially directed at pure tests of cognitive ability, this
type of accusation has been leveled at all competitive job selection
methods that show significant disparities by race.269 The thrust of
the critique is that such devices generate too many false negatives
among lower-performing minority groups. That is, these selection
methods end up excluding too many minority candidates who could
adequately perform the job in question.270 
The problem of false negatives can be traced to limitations
inherent in all personnel screens, which are imperfect predictors of
eventual job success. Even tests of cognitive ability, which are the
most powerful known prescreening devices,271 have a correlation of
around .5 with measured job performance.272 If combined with the
common practice of hiring from the top down or above a given cutoff
score, these tests will generate a significant amount of error in the
form of false negatives (people who fail the test but could perform
269. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 63.
270. See id. at 1125 (describing false negatives as the failure to hire or promote candidates
who would “in fact succeed on the job”).
271. See Linda S. Gottfredson, The Science and Politics of Race-Norming, 49 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 955, 955 (1994).
272. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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the job) and false positives (people who pass the test and are hired
but perform the job poorly). 
Moreover, it can be demonstrated numerically that, for any valid
selection device on which one group outperforms another, the
absolute (population adjusted) number of false negatives among
applicants in the higher-performing group is smaller than in the
lower performing group,273 which, in the case of cognitively loaded
tests, is blacks.274 The reason for this is that a relatively larger
number of persons from the lower-performing group will fall below
the selection cutoff.275 Likewise, the absolute number of false posi-
tives will be greater among the higher-performing group (whites).276
These effects are not specific to the racial context. Rather, they are
observed for any screening device with imperfect validity (that is,
predictive power) on which two identifiable groups differ in average
performance or the distribution of performance.277 
273. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1223-27 (showing numerically the effect of false
negatives on a group that performs worse on a test relative to a higher performing group); see
also Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 956 (noting the National Academy of Sciences
Committee’s critique regarding the effect of cognitive ability tests: “Minority workers at a
given level of job performance have much less chance of being selected than majority workers
at the same level of job performance, and thus are burdened with higher false-[negative]
rates”).
274. See, e.g. Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 956 (noting that blacks scored one standard
deviation below whites on the GATB); Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 929.
275. For a test on which blacks score lower than whites, more blacks will fail, and there
will be more false negatives among this lower performing group. The false negative rate at
any given score is applied against many more negatives (failing scores) from the low
performing group, thus generating a relatively higher number of persons who could do the job
but are not hired. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1223-27; Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at
935. 
276. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1226 (“[W]hites who will in fact turn out to be poor
workers get hired considerably more frequently than do blacks who will turn out to be poor
workers.”). In sum, a comparison of group profiles reveals that more people from the lower-
performing group will fail to “pass the test” relative to the higher-performing
group—including more people who could have done the job but nonetheless do not make the
cutoff score (false negatives). Likewise, relatively more people from the higher performing
group will pass the test, including more people who ultimately cannot do the job (false
positives). 
277. See Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 933 (noting that group differentials in false
negatives and positives “are inevitable when a test that predicts performance with less than
perfect accuracy and on which group differences exist is used in a top-down fashion”); see also
Kelman, supra note 63, at 1230 (“[I]n any ex ante probabilistic screening system, the existence
of false positives and negatives ensures that factual equals will not be treated equally.”).
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On the question of excessive numbers of false negatives, the IOP
community has engaged in a complex debate that cannot be
exhaustively reviewed here. In general, psychometricians have
adopted a number of tacks. First, some have challenged the notion
that a fair test is one that produces the same number of false
negatives, regardless of average group performance. Rather, many
experts embrace the notion of a fairly meritocractic test as one that
is both valid and unbiased—in being equally predictive of productiv-
ity for persons from all groups.278 In fact, there is extensive evidence
that commonly used employment screens meet this criterion and are
not biased against minorities on this metric. Second, critics have
noted that proposals for equalizing false negatives come at consider-
able cost or have other undesirable consequences, including gen-
erating an excessive number of false positives from lower-perform-
ing groups.279 
One approach IOP specialists suggest for dealing with false
negatives, as well as performance disparities generally, is subgroup
norming.280 By applying different standards or cutoffs for candidates
from different groups, race-norming can reduce or eliminate adverse
impact through the adjustment of the number of candidates
selected. One common method is to employ “dual lists” and to choose
the best candidates from each group through a top-down selection
278. This is the widely used “Cleary” model of test fairness, which looks at whether the test
has the same predictive validity for different sociodemographic groups, regardless of their
average level of performance. Most job selection criteria have been demonstrated to be fair
on this model. See, e.g., Sackett, Borneman & Connelly, supra note 116, at 223 (noting that,
for most commonly used employment screening devices, the “regression lines relating test
scores to criterion performance” are similar for blacks and whites and may even over-predict
minority performance, which would tend to work in blacks’ favor); see also Kelman, supra note
63, at 1223 (referring to Cleary’s assertion that “a test [is] unbiased so long as it predicts
minority performance on the job as well as it predicts nonminority performance”); Daniel A.
Newman, Paul J. Hanges & James L. Outtz, Racial Groups and Test Fairness, Considering
History and Construct Validity, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1082, 1082 (2007) (discussing the
Cleary criterion of bias in testing); Sackett, De Corte & Lievens, supra note 130, at 468
(discussing the Cleary criterion of fairness). 
279. See, e.g., Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 961 (discussing the unavoidable tradeoff
between false negatives and false positives).
280. On subgroup norming in the race context (race-norming), see, for example, Dianne C.
Brown, Subgroup Norming: Legitimate Testing Practice or Reverse Discrimination?, 49 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 927, 927-28 (1994). See also Pyburn, Ployhart & Kravitz, supra note 103, at
148-49; Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 929.
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process.281 Another is to establish distinct score or performance
cutoffs for members of each group or otherwise to relax qualifica-
tions for one group relative to another.282 
Race-norming has long been popular among IOP experts and
psychometricians. A consensus has developed that it represents the
most efficient method for reducing disparate impact in the employ-
ment arena.283 Indeed, in 1989 the National Academy of Sciences
(the Academy) issued a report recommending race-conscious score
adjustments on the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), a test
written exam that was widely used by the U.S. Employment Service
of the Department of Labor to screen potential government em-
ployees.284 The Academy endorsed the GATB as a valid, unbiased
predictor of job success across the board, and acknowledged that the
test’s racially disparate impact “is due not to [the test’s] imperfec-
tions[,] but to substantial racial differences in the job-related skills,
abilities, and knowledge[ ] [the test] reveal[s].”285 In justifying race-
norming of the GATB, the report explained that race-conscious
selection best minimizes the costs of achieving diversity because it
relaxes standards only for the minority population and allows a
more competitive process to be retained for others.286 It thus
281. See Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 957 (discussing “within-group scoring” schemes).
282. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 63, at 1241 (discussing race-norming, and describing how
“employers might systematically and openly add points to black applicants’ test scores or hire
a higher proportion of black applicants with low test scores”). 
283. See, e.g., Wayne F. Cascio, Rick Jacobs & Jay Silva, Validity, Utility, and Adverse
Impact: Practical Implications From 30 Years of Data, in ADVERSE IMPACT, supra note 50, at
271, 282 (noting that “race-norming” is “the single best way to maximize validity and utility
simultaneously, while minimizing adverse impact”); Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 931
(noting that race-norming best reconciles the competing goals of “achiev[ing] productivity
gains through the use of [a] selection device, but at the same time wanting to reduce or
eliminate adverse impact against members of any group”); Sackett & Roth, supra note 128,
at 566, 570 (noting that race-norming achieves greater diversity with less sacrifice in validity
than alternative race-neutral adjustments and commenting that none of the proposed
alternatives “come[s] remotely close to a minority hiring rate consistent with minority
representation in the applicant pool”).
284. COMM. ON THE GEN. APTITUDE TEST BATTERY, FAIRNESS IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING:
VALIDITY GENERALIZATION, MINORITY ISSUES, AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY 6-8
(John A. Hartigan & Alexandra K. Wigdor eds., 1989); see also Gottfredson, supra note 271,
at 955, 956-57. 
285. Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 955 (citing ABILITY TESTING: USES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND CONTROVERSIES PT. I. (A.K. Wigdor & W.R. Garner eds., 1982)).
286. See COMM. ON THE GEN. APTITUDE TEST BATTERY, supra note 284, at 278.
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maintains overall employee quality better than the generalized
lowering of requirements that would otherwise be necessary to avoid
an adverse impact.287 
In further defending its recommendation to race-norm the GATB,
the Academy report acknowledged the “false negatives” objection
that a single race-blind cutoff excludes too many minorities who
could do the job.288 Race-norming does indeed mitigate this exclusion
by mandating the hiring or promotion of more minorities who would
have been rejected. This reduces the number of black false negatives
relative to whites, because relatively more blacks who would have
been rejected are now hired. 
As with relaxing standards more generally, however, lowering
the cutoff score for minorities is not without costs. Although prev-
iously false negatives are now pushed into the positive category,
more minorities with lower scores are hired. This increases the
number of false positives from the minority, lower-scoring group. If
the race-norming is pronounced, most of the people observed to fail
on the job will be minorities.289 That effect is exacerbated by the fact
that the false positive rate is not independent of a candidate’s test
performance. The probability of failure increases as a candidate’s
287. This argument is similar to that made by Jeff Rosen for allowing affirmative action
in education. He asserts that a ban on achieving diversity by lowering college admission
standards selectively for lower-performing minority groups will lead to relaxing them across
the board, thus compromising the academic quality of institutions generally. See Jeff Rosen,
How I Learned To Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 1, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/06/01/magazine/how-i-learned-to-love-quotas.html?pagewanted=allGsrc.pm (noting that
“selective universities can’t achieve colorblindness, diversity and high admission standards
at the same time” and expressing a preference for the “relatively modest concession
represented by affirmative action” over the wholesale lowering of academic standards that
will inevitably accompany pressures to achieve greater diversity); see also John R. Lott, Jr.,
Does a Helping Hand Put Others at Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police Departments, and Crime,
38 ECON. INQUIRY 239, 249 (2000) (“Changing tests to employ a greater percentage of blacks
can make it more difficult to screen out lower-quality candidates generally.”).
288. See COMM. ON THE GEN. APTITUDE TEST BATTERY, supra note 284, at 277-78.
289. On this point see, for example, Gottfredson, supra note 271, at 961, which provides a
numerical example based on hypothetical scores on a typical job screening test to show that
“the same score adjustments that reduce the rate of false negatives” can “also increase the
rate of false positives among Blacks, because they bump many true negatives into the false
positive category.” Under Gottfredson’s hypothetical numerical example of hiring using race-
norming for black job candidates, the number of false negatives falls significantly, “from 50%
to 13%, [but] the rate of false positives increases from 17% to 59%.” Id. In addition, “two
thirds of all poor workers [among hires] would ... be Black, despite Blacks composing less than
one third of all workers hired.” Id.
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score declines. Under race-norming, most of the lowest scoring
individuals will be from the minority group, and relatively more of
them will fail to meet performance standards.290
In imposing a less exacting requirement for lower-performing
groups while maintaining a higher and different standard for
others, race-norming amounts to a form of affirmative action that
incorporates a race-conscious double standard. This places the
practice at odds with the meritocractic underpinnings of the
disparate impact rule. It is also expressly illegal under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.291 Thus, although race-norming is an efficient
way to achieve more diversity, its formal adoption is not presently
feasible without a change in the law. 
Like the problem of adverse impact generally, the problem of false
negatives has generated continuing concern, fueling repeated
attempts to devise new personnel procedures that more accurately
predict job performance while mitigating or even eliminating
racially disparate impact. One hope is that the false negative prob-
lem can be solved by developing more sensitive and accurate job
screens. Unfortunately, attempts to modify selection methods to
generate fewer false negatives have not borne fruit. And given
current realities, devising more “sensitive” criteria—that is, those
that are better able to identify successful workers—is unlikely to
reduce racially adverse impacts significantly and may sometimes
have the opposite effect. Most criteria that improve predictions for
one group will do so across the board. This means that the racial
balance of workers selected will not change much, even if the
relative number of false negatives among a less qualified group
declines. As the literature clearly indicates, the main driver of ad-
verse impacts is the availability of qualified workers, not the fact
290. See id. (noting that under race-norming schemes that increase false positives among
minorities, “[b]eing Black would ... be strongly associated with being a poor worker”).
291. As noted, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1991 to outlaw race-
norming or racial adjustments in scores on job tests. See supra note 43. Further, in the wake
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, public employers have limited leeway
to take race-conscious steps to avoid liability for the racially disparate impact of employment
practices under the constitutional Equal Protection guarantee, and those restrictions may
extend to private employers also. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009)
(requiring an employer to have “a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to
disparate impact liability” before engaging in intentional discrimination to avoid such
liability).
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that potentially successful workers are not being identified.
Numerically, the magnitude of racial differences far outweighs the
imperfections in existing predictive instruments.292
The effort to exclude fewer blacks by achieving greater accuracy
in job screening is at bottom another attempt to evade the validity-
diversity tradeoff—a project that, as discussed above, has failed so
far and, without significant upgrades in minority human capital, is
destined to fail. Additionally, there are inherent limits to the
accuracy of even the most predictive screens. As one IOP expert has
noted, unavoidable imperfections in prediction and measurement
mean that “there is clearly nothing an employer can do to design a
better selection system.”293 Multiple factors affect individual per-
formance, but they are not all “knowable before hire”294 and thus are
not amenable to accurate identification ahead of time. Moreover,
even conceding that current methods sometimes err by excluding
some blacks (and other candidates) who could do the job, “the
optimal selection system” remains one with substantial disparate
impact.295 In sum, given the limits inherent in identifying good
workers, efforts to produce more diversity by fiddling with job cri-
teria or creating more predictive screens are unlikely to work. In
any event, the real problem lies in the distribution of human capital,
not in the instruments used to measure it. As long as there is a
relative shortage of skilled minority workers, current levels of ad-
verse impact are likely to persist.296
Finally, the proposal to repeal the disparate impact rule must be
compared to an even more radical alternative, which is to abolish ex
ante requirements altogether and shift to a system of probationary
hiring. Mark Kelman has proposed that employers abandon all pre-
hire screening in favor of random selection, or staffing by lottery.
Managers would assess employees’ job performance directly and
discharge individuals whose work falls short.297 This proposal has
292. See supra text accompanying note 122.
293. Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105, at 934.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., WAX, supra note 112, at 73-76 (discussing the “skills deficits” among minority
workers and attempts to address this problem); see also supra text accompanying note 111.
297. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1222, 1245-46; see also Sackett & Wilk, supra note 105,
at 994 (observing that “if one gave all applicants a job tryout and kept the highest performers
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serious drawbacks. Where there are fewer positions than job-
seekers, employers will miss out on applicants who are better
matched to jobs than those likely to be chosen randomly, with sig-
nificant costs to efficiency.298 Second, even if the number of minority
false negatives could be somewhat reduced, this would not necessar-
ily solve the problem of adverse impact. Although racially propor-
tionate hiring could be accomplished ex ante, some degree of
imbalance will inevitably emerge ex post. Screening after hiring
rather than before does nothing to alter the background distribution
in job-related skills. More minorities will likely be fired following
the probationary period, thus reintroducing the problem of adverse
impact on the back end. This result would encourage familiar chal-
lenges to the fairness of on-the-job assessments and raise suspicions
concerning the “discretion inherent in ex post screening systems.”299
In any event, any diversity gains would be achieved at the cost of
lowering productivity and imposing a weighty burden on employers
to supervise, evaluate, and deal with probationary hires with a wide
range of proficiency. Considerable investments in job training would
be lost, and the high risk of being fired would deter employees from
developing job-related skills.300 
Despite its considerable costs, Kelman’s proposal suggests an
alternative to current practice and a possible way out of the dilem-
ma it poses. As noted above, a proper understanding and application
of the disparate impact rule is unlikely to achieve greater workforce
racial balance, and indeed might move the situation in the opposite
direction.301 If diversity is the goal, however, there are other ways
to achieve it. Directly enacting race-based affirmative action in the
... one would retain considerably more Blacks than would be hired” using screens with greater
black-white differences than actual performance differences). 
298. See Kelman, supra note 63, at 1233 (acknowledging the “additional costs of ex post
screening”).
299. Id. 
300. See, e.g., Douglas O. Staiger & Jonah E. Rockoff, Searching for Effective Teachers with
Imperfect Information, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 98, 115 (2010) (recommending a new approach
to hiring teachers that combines “an easy entry policy” for all college graduates with “an
aggressive dismissal policy” that “identif[ies] large differences between teachers by observing
the first few years of teaching performance and retaining only the highest-performing
teachers” but expressing the reservation that potential teachers might be “uneasy about
investing time and effort in the difficult first years of teaching” in the face of a significant
probability of being fired).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 163-71.
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workplace might prove difficult politically and may run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. But there is a race-
neutral alternative. As noted above, there is no general requirement
to adopt a system of competitive meritocratic job selection.302 A more
diverse government workforce—including fire and police depart-
ments—can be achieved by relaxing job requirements or abandoning
meritocratic criteria altogether. 
Disparate impact rules would appear to allow employers to use a
screen with less adverse impact, even if it were less predictive of job
success. So civil service exams could be selected or redesigned to
reduce adverse impact. To be sure, there are unresolved questions
in the wake of the Ricci decision about the circumstances in which
employers are permitted to resolve the validity-diversity tradeoff in
favor of more diversity. Although the Court invalidated a decision
to discard an existing test that was motivated by a desire to avoid
a racially disparate impact, that case involved identifiable victims
with reliance interests in specific test results.303 The opinion does
not necessarily cast aspersions on the full range of choices that
employers might make to achieve greater diversity. Specifically, it
does not rule out the political or administrative choice to give a very
easy test or to use criteria that are minimally dependent on cogni-
tive ability.
The validity-diversity tradeoff indicates that any test that sig-
nificantly reduces adverse impact will also seriously compromise
validity.304 The question is then: why bother with a test at all?
Diversity might be better achieved, at least for government jobs, by
dropping civil service exams entirely in favor of minimal threshold
requirements coupled with lotteries or random selection from
available applicants. Because many civil service laws and labor
contracts mandate competitive exams, a shift to this system would
require some political will.305 This method might ultimately prove
more efficient, and certainly would be much simpler, than elaborate
litigation based on the chimerical, elusive quest for performance-
predictive civil service screens with less adverse impact. Adopting
302. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
303. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
304. See, e.g., supra note 289 and accompanying text.
305. See Rutherglen, supra note 43, at 113.
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this method would require facing up to its consequences and giving
up on the fiction that the validity-diversity tradeoff can be over-
come. It may impose burdens of personnel supervision, training, and
evaluation that are greater than at present. And a more diverse civil
service may come at the cost of a less capable one. But if the
citizenry considers diversity a top priority, these may be tradeoffs
it is willing to make.
CONCLUSION
Under present job market conditions, the validity-diversity trade-
off prevails. The more predictive a job selection device, the greater
its adverse impact. To date there is no known way around this
dilemma. The situation is not just an artifact of limitations in our
assessment measures, although they do have limitations. Rather, it
reflects real underlying group differences in developed abilities, and
the real impact these abilities have on job performance. These gaps
in measured human capital are in turn traceable to complex social
circumstances with myriad roots, both present and historical.306
The argument for abolishing the disparate impact doctrine is that
it does not currently comport with reality and does little to change
it. Its goals and assumptions are at odds with what we know about
educational disparities, productivity, job performance, and human
capital. The four-fifths rule and other elements of the doctrine
embody this mismatch between theory and reality. Above all, dispa-
rate impact litigation represents a costly, misplaced effort that
distracts from the root causes of workforce imbalance and draws
306. See supra Part II.B (discussing factors behind skill gaps between whites and
minorities).
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resources away from the initiatives needed to address it.307 In light
of this reality, disparate impact should be altered or abolished.
307. See, e.g., ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 112, at 377 (noting that “improving the
academic performance of underrepresented minority students constitutes the only viable,
long-run strategy for preserving meaningful minority representation” in higher education and
in demanding jobs and asserting that “we need to make closing the racial achievement gap
a high societal priority and to move aggressively with the greatest determination to make it
happen”). Relaxing the standard for disparate impact liability, or abolishing it altogether,
could have other salutary effects. The college admissions process and the college degree
requirement that employers currently impose serve as an elaborate system of screening.
Eliminating liability for disparate impact would free employers to test for ability directly
without worrying about racial effects, thus making the acquisition of expensive and
prestigious educational credentials less important. This change would also encourage
potential employees to hone the skills that employers are seeking. See, e.g., Jonathan V. Last,
America’s One-Child Policy, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 27, 2010, at 22, 29 (suggesting that “[i]f
Griggs were rolled back, it would upend the college system at a stroke” because it would free
employers to test directly for general ability, thus decreasing the importance of educational
credentials that employers rely on for screening).
